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Polymorphous Public Law Litigation:
The Forgotten History of Nineteenth
Century Public Law Litigation
David Sloss
Abstract
Recent debates about popular constitutionalism and judicial
supremacy have focused on the question of who interprets the
Constitution. This Article reframes the debate by asking what
legal sources courts apply to protect individual rights from
government infringement. Throughout the nineteenth century,
federal courts applied a mix of international law, statutory, and
common law to protect fundamental rights and restrain
government action. This Article uncovers the forgotten history of
nineteenth century public law litigation.
Professors Post and Siegel have advocated “policentric
constitutional interpretation,” wherein the Supreme Court shares
authority for constitutional interpretation with other actors. By
analogy, this Article introduces the concept of “polymorphous
public law litigation.” Under the polymorphous model, instead of
fixating on constitutional law as the dominant public law
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discourse, courts apply international law, statutes, and common
law—and occasionally constitutional law—to decide public law
controversies. The Article demonstrates that nineteenth century
federal courts applied a polymorphous model of public law
litigation.
During the twentieth century, a constitutionalized model of
public law litigation supplanted the polymorphous model. In the
constitutionalized model, courts rely primarily on constitutional
law to decide public law cases. The process of constitutionalization
exacerbated the tension between judicial review and popular
sovereignty. When the Supreme Court applies constitutional law to
decide a case, the Court does not merely decide the case; it also
creates or modifies a legal rule that is not subject to revision by
legislative majorities. In contrast, when the Court applies other
types of law, Congress or state legislatures retain the power to
modify the controlling legal rule. Hence, revival of a polymorphous
model would help mitigate the tension between judicial review
and popular sovereignty.
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I. Introduction
Larry Kramer and Mark Tushnet have sparked a vigorous
scholarly debate about the merits of judicial supremacy.1 To date,
that debate has focused primarily on the question of who
interprets the Constitution.2 Is the Supreme Court “the ultimate
1. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 7 (1999).
2. The literature is vast. For an excellent introduction to the debate, see
the symposium in Volume 92 of the CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, including articles
by Larry Kramer, Erwin Chemerinsky, Robert Post and Reva Siegel, and
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expositor of the constitutional text,”3 as the Court claims? To
what extent do Congress, the President, and “the people
themselves” share the power to interpret and enforce the
Constitution?
This Article reframes the debate about judicial supremacy by
raising a different question: what legal sources do courts apply to
protect individual rights from government infringement? In the
modern era, we respond, almost reflexively, that courts apply the
Constitution for this purpose. However, nineteenth century
federal courts relied primarily on other sources of law, and only
occasionally on constitutional law, to protect individual rights
from government infringement. This Article recovers the
forgotten history of nineteenth century public law litigation. In
that era, federal courts routinely applied a mix of international
law, statutes, and common law to protect fundamental rights and
restrain government action.
How does the history relate to current debates about judicial
supremacy? To answer that question, let us begin with a
definition and some data. This Article defines the term “public
law cases” to comprise litigated cases involving a dispute between
a private party and a government actor in which the private
party alleges that the government committed, or threatened to
commit, a violation of some established legal norm.4 Between
1801 and 1864, the Supreme Court applied international law in
about 42% of the public law cases decided on the merits. During
that period, the Court applied constitutional law in only about
13% of the public law cases decided on the merits. In contrast,
between 1954 and 2005, the Court applied international law in
only about 3% of the public law cases decided on the merits, while
it applied constitutional law in about 64% of the public law cases
decided on the merits.5 In short, the discourse of public law has
Frederick Schauer. See generally Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum,
Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004)).
3. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000).
4. The proper definition of “public law cases” is contested. See infra notes
32–36 and accompanying text (discussing various definitions of “public law
cases”).
5. The data in this paragraph is drawn from an original database created
by the author. Detailed information about the database and data analysis is
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changed from an international law discourse to a constitutional
law discourse. The “constitutionalization” of American public law
is the process wherein constitutional law displaced other sources
of law as the dominant public law discourse in federal courts.
There is a deep tension between constitutionalization and the
democratic commitment to popular sovereignty because
constitutionalization transferred lawmaking authority from
legislatures to federal courts. When the Supreme Court applies a
statute or international legal rule to decide a case, the Court
exercises final decision-making authority in that case, but
Congress retains the power to modify the controlling domestic
rule if Congress dislikes the Court’s decision.6 In contrast, when
the Court applies constitutional law to decide a case, it does not
merely decide the case; it also creates or modifies a controlling
legal rule that is not subject to revision by a legislative majority.
Hence, the process of constitutionalization transferred
lawmaking authority from legislative bodies to federal courts by
generating a legal discourse in which courts decide public law
cases by applying legal rules that are not subject to revision by
ordinary legislation.
The Court’s classic decision in Pennoyer v. Neff7 illustrates
the effect of constitutionalization. Pennoyer involved a default
judgment issued by an Oregon state court.8 Neff, the losing
defendant in state court, sued Pennoyer in federal court to
challenge the validity of the default judgment, claiming he “was a
non-resident of the State . . . [who] was not personally served
with process, and did not appear therein.”9 The state court
plaintiff served Neff by publication in a newspaper—a service

presented in Part III.
6. Congress cannot unilaterally modify the international legal meaning of
a rule of international law. However, Congress can enact legislation to control
the domestic legal application of international law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1)(a) (1987) (stating
that an act of Congress can supersede an earlier rule of international law “if the
purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act
and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled”).
7. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
8. See id. at 720 (“[T]he judgment was entered upon [Neff’s] default in not
answering the complaint.”).
9. Id. at 719–20.
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method authorized by statute in Oregon.10 Despite express
statutory authorization for service by publication, the Supreme
Court held that the “judgment recovered in the State court of
Oregon against the plaintiff herein . . . was without any
validity.”11
The Court rested its decision on “two well-established
principles of public law.”12 First, “that every State possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory.”13 And second, “that no State can exercise
direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without
its territory.”14 The Court cited two international law treatises as
authority—Story’s treatise on Conflict of Laws, and Wheaton’s
treatise on International Law.15 The Court also stated: “The
international law . . . as it existed among the States in 1790, was
that a judgment rendered in one State, assuming to bind the
person of a citizen of another, was void within the foreign State,
when the defendant had not been served with process or
voluntarily made defence.”16 In short, the Court held that the
state court judgment was void because it conflicted with
principles of international law.
It remains unclear why the Court thought it could apply
international law to invalidate a state court judgment. One view
is that the Court decided Pennoyer on state law grounds, using
international law to interpret Oregon’s personal jurisdiction
statute.17 An alternative view is that the Court applied
10. See id. at 720 (“The Code of Oregon provides for such service when an
action is brought against a non-resident and absent defendant, who has
property within the State.”).
11. Id. at 734.
12. Id. at 722.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 730 (quoting D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 176 (1851)).
17. Two sentences in Justice Field’s opinion support this interpretation:
Construing this latter provision [of the Oregon statute] to mean, that,
in an action for money or damages where a defendant does not appear
in the court, and is not found within the State, and is not a resident
thereof, but has property therein, the jurisdiction of the court extends
only over such property, the declaration expresses a principle of
general, if not universal, law. The authority of every tribunal is
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international law as federal common law.18 Regardless, the Court
did not apply federal constitutional law to nullify the state court
judgment.19 If one construes Pennoyer as a decision interpreting
state law, then the Oregon legislature could have modified the
jurisdictional rule. If one construes Pennoyer as an application of
federal common law, Congress could have modified the Pennoyer

necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it
is established.
Id. at 720. However, the opinion fills more than fifteen pages in the U.S.
Reports. The main thrust of the opinion strongly implies, without expressly
holding, that a state jurisdictional statute inconsistent with “principles of public
law” would be invalid. The conclusion that a state statute is invalid could not be
based solely on statutory interpretation.
18. Scholars have argued that nineteenth century federal courts applied
customary international law as general common law, not federal common law.
See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International
Law as Federal Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815,
817 (1997). Under the system derived from Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842),
courts could not apply general common law to invalidate a state statute. As
indicated above, Justice Field strongly implied that a state statute purporting to
authorize jurisdiction in excess of territorial limits derived from international
law would be invalid. Hence, Justice Field may have conceived of those
territorial limits as something like federal common law, which does preempt
conflicting state law. The Court has a long tradition of applying customary
international law as federal common law to resolve disputes between states. See
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938)
(stating that the dispute involved “a question of ‘federal common law’ upon
which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive”);
Michael D. Ramsey, Customary International Law in the Supreme Court, 19011945, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE 225, 229–31, 247–49 (Sloss, Ramsey & Dodge eds. 2011) [hereinafter
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE]. In Pennoyer, Justice Field conceived of the central
issue as a jurisdictional dispute between Oregon (Pennoyer’s home state) and
California (Neff’s home state). Thus, insofar as Pennoyer suggests that state
jurisdictional rules contravening territorial limits derived from international
law would be invalid, Justice Field was arguably applying customary
international law as federal common law to resolve a jurisdictional dispute
between Oregon and California.
19. The Court’s opinion mentions the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (“Since the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . , the validity of such judgments may be directly
questioned . . . on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine
the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no
jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.”). However, the Court did not
base its holding on the Fourteenth Amendment because the state court
judgment at issue in Pennoyer was rendered in February 1866, and the
Fourteenth Amendment was not ratified until 1868. Id. at 716.
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rule.20 Regardless, some legislative body retained the power to
authorize state courts to exercise jurisdiction in contravention of
Pennoyer’s territorial rule.
Later Supreme Court decisions transformed the Pennoyer
rule from a principle of international law to a federal
constitutional rule. In short, the Court constitutionalized the
Pennoyer rule by linking it to the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.21 The transformation of Pennoyer’s territoriality
principle from an international rule to a constitutional rule
illustrates two general points about constitutionalization.22 First,
constitutionalization has produced numerous judge-made
constitutional rules that have little basis in the Constitution’s
text.23 The text of the Due Process Clause says nothing about
territorial limits on state court jurisdiction.24 Similarly, much of
modern constitutional law consists of judge-made rules that are
at best loosely related to the actual constitutional text.
Second, the process of constitutionalization transferred
lawmaking power from state and federal legislatures to federal
courts. In 1878, when the Court decided Pennoyer, either
Congress, or state legislatures, or both retained the power to
authorize state courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants in contravention of Pennoyer’s territoriality rule. By
20. Insofar as federal courts have the power to create federal common law,
Congress must be able to modify judge-made rules by exercising its Article I
powers. The contrary view—that federal courts can create common law outside
the scope of Congress’s Article I powers—would be inconsistent with Article I,
which states: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
21. See, e.g., Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 46 (1894) (“No judgment of a
court is due process of law, if rendered without jurisdiction in the court.”); see
also Thomas H. Lee & David L. Sloss, International Law as an Interpretive Tool
in the Supreme Court, 1861–1900, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 18, at
124, 151–52.
22. Pennoyer is not a “public law” case as defined in this Article. See infra
Part II.A. Even so, Pennoyer helps illustrate the impact of constitutionalization
because the Court’s subsequent personal jurisdiction doctrine transformed
Pennoyer’s international rule into a constitutional rule.
23. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 28 (2008)
(discussing “invisible” constitutional principles, which are “those that go beyond
anything that could reasonably be said to follow simply from what the
Constitution expressly says”).
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
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1900, though, neither Congress nor state legislatures had the
power to legislate contrary to the Pennoyer rule because the
Court had incorporated that rule into the Due Process Clause.25
Thus, constitutionalization transferred lawmaking power from
democratically elected legislatures to unelected federal judges.
Against this background, let us reconsider the question of
judicial supremacy. Larry Kramer defines judicial supremacy as
“the notion that judges have the last word when it comes to
constitutional interpretation and that their decisions determine
the meaning of the Constitution for everyone.”26 Critics contend
that judicial supremacy is inconsistent with popular
sovereignty.27 Advocates of judicial supremacy acknowledge the
tension between judicial supremacy and popular sovereignty but
insist that supremacy is necessary to promote other important
values.28
The history of nineteenth century public law litigation, as
elucidated in this Article, illustrates one way to mitigate the
tension between judicial supremacy and popular sovereignty.
Between 1801 and 1864, the Supreme Court resolved almost 90%
of its public law cases by applying legal norms other than
constitutional norms. Imagine that modern legal discourse was
transformed so that litigants framed most of their public law
claims as statutory, common law, or international law claims,
and federal courts decided most public law cases without
applying constitutional law. In those circumstances, the political
salience of judicial supremacy would be greatly diminished.
Judicial supremacy would remain the rule for the small subset of
25. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause governs the territorial
jurisdiction of federal courts in federal question cases. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Congress may authorize federal courts to exercise jurisdiction beyond the
Fourteenth Amendment limits that apply to state courts, but Congress may not
authorize jurisdiction beyond limits set by the Fifth Amendment. See generally
JOEL WILLIAM FRIEDMAN, JONATHAN M. LANDERS & MICHAEL G. COLLINS, THE
LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 126 (2002).
26. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 125.
27. See generally TUSHNET, supra note 1.
28. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to
Professor Kramer, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1013, 1013 (2004) (emphasizing “[t]he rights
of minorities . . . criminal defendants, public benefits recipients, and others”);
Alexander & Solum, supra note 2, at 1629, 1634–35 (emphasizing “rule of law”
values and the need for settlement).
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public law cases where courts applied constitutional law, but the
revised legal discourse would mitigate the tension between
judicial supremacy and popular sovereignty. Federal courts would
decide the vast majority of public law cases by applying legal
rules that could be revised by majority vote in a democratically
elected legislature.
Professors Post and Siegel have advocated “policentric
constitutional
interpretation,”
wherein
authority
for
constitutional interpretation is divided among the Supreme
Court, Congress, and other actors.29 By analogy, this Article
introduces the concept of “polymorphous public law litigation.”
Under the polymorphous model, instead of fixating on
constitutional law as the dominant public law discourse, lawyers
and judges invoke and apply treaties, customary international
law, statutes, common law—and occasionally constitutional law—
to litigate and decide public law controversies.30 This Article
demonstrates that nineteenth century federal courts actually
applied a polymorphous model of public law litigation.
Part II sets forth a conceptual framework for the ensuing
discussion by analyzing the relationship among five key concepts:
public law litigation, judicial review, judicial supremacy,
constitutionalization, and popular sovereignty. Part III presents
an empirical analysis of constitutionalization, drawing on an
original database created by the author. Part IV presents two
case studies to illustrate the application of a polymorphous model
of public law litigation by nineteenth century federal courts.
Part V addresses the contemporary feasibility and desirability of

29. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1947 (2003) (“The policentric model holds that for
purposes of Section 5 power the Constitution should be regarded as having
multiple interpreters, both political and legal. The model attributes equal
interpretive authority to Congress and to the Court.”).
30. Insofar as the polymorphous model would reduce judicial reliance on
constitutional law, it is similar to Professor Schauer’s concept of the “modest
Constitution.” See Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest
Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1065 (2004) (“To believe in the modest
Constitution . . . is, instead, to disagree with the notion that when these
questions are determined by the people the debate is or should be channeled
through the Constitution.”).
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reversing the process of constitutionalization and reviving a
polymorphous model of public law litigation.
II. Conceptual Framework
Part II is divided into three subparts. The first section
discusses the concept of public law litigation. The next section
analyzes the relationship between judicial review and popular
sovereignty. The final section addresses the relationship between
constitutionalization and judicial supremacy.
A. What is Public Law Litigation?
There is no agreed definition of the term “public law
litigation.” “Private law litigation” is easier to define. In private
law cases, courts are “called upon to resolve private disputes
between private individuals according to the principles of private
law.”31 One could define “public law cases” to encompass
everything other than private law cases, but that definition is
overbroad.32 Professor Chayes says that public law litigation
includes cases in which courts “are asked to deal with grievances
over the administration of some public or quasi-public program
and to vindicate the public policies embodied in the governing
statutes or constitutional provisions.”33 This definition is
excessively narrow. It excludes cases in which courts are asked to
vindicate the public policies embodied in treaties or customary
international law. Those cases comprised a substantial portion of
the Supreme Court’s public law caseload before the Civil War.
Professors Goldsmith and Levinson define “public law” to
include “constitutional and international law—legal regimes that
both constitute and govern the behavior of states and state
actors.”34 Their analysis provides important insights about the
31. Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court,
96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1982).
32. Three categories of cases are neither “private law” nor “public law”
cases, as those terms are used in this Article. See infra note 61 (discussing three
types of cases that are neither private law nor public law cases).
33. Chayes, supra note 31, at 4.
34. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
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similarities between international law and constitutional law.35
Moreover, their definition is helpful because it focuses on the use
of law to govern the behavior of state actors. However, their
analysis obscures the fact that courts also apply statutory and
common law to regulate state actors.
This Article adopts a functional approach. In private law
cases, courts adjudicate disputes between private parties. In
public law cases, private actors ask courts to apply their judicial
power to regulate the conduct of government actors. Accordingly,
this Article defines public law cases to comprise litigated cases
involving a dispute between a private party and a government
actor in which the private party alleges that the government
actor committed, or threatened to commit, a violation of some
established legal norm.36 The legal norm might be expressed in
constitutional law, statutory law, international law, or common
law. The defining feature of public law litigation is not the source
of the norm; it is the fact that a private party seeks judicial
assistance in regulating the conduct of government actors.
B. Judicial Review and Popular Sovereignty
Courts engage in “judicial review,” as defined herein,37 when
they assess the legality of federal, state, or local government
action, including action by legislatures, courts, and executive or
administrative agencies or officers.38 Judicial review typically
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1795 (2009).
35. See generally id.
36. Aside from the inclusion of international law claims, the difference
between Professor Chayes’s definition and mine is largely semantic. By focusing
on the effort to “vindicate the public policies embodied in the governing statutes
or constitutional provisions,” Chayes tacitly adopts the government’s
perspective. Chayes, supra note 31, at 4. By focusing on violations of legal norms
by government officers, my definition purposefully adopts the private party’s
perspective. Regardless, the class of cases covered by the two formulations is
similar.
37. Judicial review is not the same as public law litigation. Courts
sometimes perform judicial review in private law cases. Infra note 73 and
accompanying text.
38. The term “judicial review” is sometimes defined more narrowly to
include only cases where courts evaluate the constitutional validity of
legislation. That narrow definition would exclude most nineteenth century
public law litigation because nineteenth century lawyers challenged executive
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involves some element of judicial lawmaking. Courts are required
to apply the law. However, the line between “applying law” and
“making law” is notoriously fuzzy. In most cases, appellate judges
“make” law in the very process of “applying” law. When judges
apply specific, narrowly drawn legal rules, the leeway for judicial
lawmaking is more limited. When they apply broad, vaguely
worded legal rules, the leeway for judicial lawmaking is greater.
Appellate judges often apply broad, vaguely worded legal rules
because that is an essential part of their job. Therefore, appellate
judges cannot perform the vital task of judicial review without
engaging in some judicial lawmaking.
“Popular sovereignty” means that people are governed by
laws of their own creation. The people can make law directly, by
referendum, or indirectly, by electing representatives who make
laws on their behalf.39 Given the inevitability of judicial
lawmaking, there is inherent tension between judicial review and
popular sovereignty because judge-made law is not made by “the
people.”40 Other things being equal, the tension between judicial
review and popular sovereignty is mitigated when the outcome of
judicial lawmaking is subject to modification by a popularly
elected legislature. In contrast, the tension between judicial
review and popular sovereignty is exacerbated when the product
of judicial lawmaking is not subject to revision by an elected
legislature.
This observation provides a basis for assessing the impact on
popular sovereignty of different forms of judicial review. If the
Supreme Court applies federal constitutional law as a rule of
decision, the Court does not merely decide the case. It also
and administrative action much more frequently than they challenged
legislative action. See infra Part III.E (comparing claims challenging the
validity of legislation and claims challenging the legality of executive or
administrative action). This Article adopts a broad definition to facilitate
comparison between nineteenth century judicial review and modern judicial
review.
39. Citizens also shape lawmaking in less formal ways, but elections and
referenda are the primary formal mechanisms for citizens to influence the
lawmaking process.
40. Various mechanisms empower citizens to exercise popular control over
judges. The peoples’ representatives in the Senate must confirm federal judges.
Many states have some form of judicial elections. Regardless, the average
citizen has less power to control judicial lawmaking than he or she has to
influence legislative lawmaking.
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creates or modifies the controlling rule, yielding a constitutional
rule that is not subject to revision by legislative majorities in
Congress or state legislatures.41 Thus, in a system characterized
by judicial supremacy, judicial review based on federal
constitutional law tends to exacerbate the tension between
judicial review and popular sovereignty because judge-made
constitutional law cannot be modified by a popularly elected
legislature.42
In contrast, if the Supreme Court applies a federal statute to
decide a case, the Court has final decision-making authority in
the case, but Congress retains the power to amend the statute. If
the Court applies a treaty to decide a case, Congress cannot
rewrite the treaty, but Congress can enact a later-in-time statute
that supersedes the treaty for purposes of domestic law. 43
Similarly, when the Court applies customary international law to
decide a case, Congress cannot rewrite the international legal
rule, but some domestic legislature has the power to enact
legislation to displace the international rule for purposes of
domestic law.44 Thus, judicial review based on statutes, treaties,
or customary international law mitigates the tension between
41. Some federal constitutional rules are subordinated to the will of
Congress. For example, Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution lists actions that
states shall not undertake “without the Consent of Congress.” U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10. Regardless, the vast majority of federal constitutional rules are not subject
to revision by legislative majorities.
42. Some forms of constitutional judicial review are democracy-enhancing.
See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court 2011 Term, Foreword:
Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) (“The animating impulse
behind many of the Warren Court’s major decisions was a commitment to civic
inclusion and democratic decisionmaking.”). However, constitutional judicial
review as practiced by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts tends to exacerbate
the tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty. See generally id. at
27–71.
43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 115(1)(a) (1987) (“An act of Congress supersedes . . . a
provision of an international agreement as law of the United States if the
purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act
and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled.”).
44. If a rule of customary international law falls within the scope of
Congress’s legislative authority, Congress can enact federal legislation to modify
the controlling domestic rule. Id. If the international rule is beyond the scope of
Congress’s legislative authority, then it presumably falls within the scope of
state legislative authority, and state legislatures can modify the controlling
domestic rule.
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judicial review and popular sovereignty because popularly elected
legislatures retain the power to modify the controlling domestic
rules if they dislike the outcome of the Court’s judicial
lawmaking.45
Scholars who criticize the democracy deficit of international
law typically focus on the initial lawmaking process, not the
power of elected legislatures to modify the results of judicial
lawmaking. Under this view, one could say that the Constitution
is “democratic” because the original Constitution was ratified by
state conventions whose members were popularly elected.46
Moreover, much international law is “undemocratic” because it is
not made by popularly elected legislatures.47
Although it is reasonable to compare the democratic
legitimacy of international and constitutional law by reference to
the initial lawmaking process, the preceding argument is
misleading. Virtually all modern federal constitutional law is
constitutional common law; it is the product of a judicial
lawmaking process that is largely untethered from the
constitutional text.48 Constitutional common law has never been
approved by majority vote in any legislature. Therefore, the
process for making federal constitutional law is in tension with
the ideal of popular sovereignty because most federal

45. The rule that Congress has the power to override customary
international law was well settled before the Civil War. See David L. Sloss,
Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, International Law in the Supreme
Court to 1860, at 32–34, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 18 (discussing
the relationship between federal statutes and the law of nations). The rule that
Congress has the power to override treaties did not become firmly established
until the 1870s or 1880s. Id. at 18–19; Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties in the
Supreme Court, 1861–1900, at 73–74, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 18
(explaining the development of the idea that treaties and statutes are
equivalent and that Congress could therefore override both).
46. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 113–28 (1996) (discussing state ratifying
conventions).
47. See generally John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International
Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2007).
48. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1996) (“And it is the common law approach, not the
approach that connects law to an authoritative text, or an authoritative decision
by the Framers or by ‘we the people,’ that best explains, and best justifies,
American constitutional law today.”).
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constitutional law is made by unelected judges, not popularly
elected legislatures.49
Concerns about the democracy deficit of international law
focus on the process for creating law on the international plane.
Broadly speaking, those concerns are well-founded.50 However, in
evaluating whether international-law-based judicial review is
consistent with principles of popular sovereignty, the more
salient question is how a particular rule of international law is
incorporated into domestic law. If an international norm is
incorporated into domestic law by majority vote in an elected
legislature, application of that norm by domestic courts is
generally consistent with principles of popular sovereignty. Here,
one must distinguish between treaties, congressional–executive
agreements, sole executive agreements, and customary
international law.
An Article II treaty becomes law in the United States only
after a supermajority vote in the Senate and Presidential
ratification.51 Similarly, congressional–executive agreements
require a majority vote in both Houses of Congress.52 Thus,
judicial application of Article II treaties and congressional–
executive agreements is broadly consistent with popular
sovereignty53 because those legal norms are incorporated into

49. The tension remains, even assuming that other features of our
constitutional system ensure that the Court’s constitutional decisions do not
stray too far from current majoritarian preferences.
50. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 47.
51. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur . . . .”).
52. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e (1987).
53. There are two types of congressional–executive agreements: “ex ante”
and “ex post.” Congress approves ex post agreements after the text has been
negotiated. The democratic pedigree of such agreements is unimpeachable. The
Executive Branch negotiates ex ante agreements on the basis of prior statutory
authorization. The Executive Branch sometimes claims prior authorization
based on statutory language that is vague, outdated, or both. Accordingly,
scholars have challenged the democratic pedigree of ex ante agreements, noting
that the Executive Branch sometimes claims statutory authorization for an
agreement that is largely the product of lawmaking by unelected executive
officials. See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power Over International Law:
Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 155–67 (2009).
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U.S. law by a majoritarian, democratic process.54 In contrast,
courts sometimes apply sole executive agreements55 or rules of
customary international law56 that have not been approved by
any domestic legislature. Judicial review of government conduct
by reference to sole executive agreements, or unincorporated
customary international law,57 creates greater tension with
popular sovereignty because courts are applying legal norms that
have not been approved by a popularly elected legislature.
In sum, concerns about the democratic legitimacy of
international law are well-founded, insofar as one focuses on the
lawmaking process on the international plane. However, judicial
application of federal constitutional law exacerbates the tension
between judicial review and popular sovereignty more than any
other form of judicial review. Most modern constitutional law is
the product of a lawmaking process controlled by unelected
federal judges. Moreover, judicial lawmaking based on federal
constitutional law—unlike judicial lawmaking based on treaties,
executive agreements, or customary international law—yields
outcomes that are not subject to revision by a popularly elected
legislature.

54. Many international agreements include broad, vaguely worded
provisions that leave ample leeway for judicial lawmaking. Such agreements are
similar to the Constitution in this respect. However, in contrast to the
Constitution, judicial lawmaking based on such international agreements is
subject to revision by elected legislatures.
55. Sole executive agreements are binding international agreements
concluded by the President without congressional approval on the basis of his
Article II authority. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmts. g, h (1987) (discussing the President’s
authority to make sole executive agreements and limitations on the subject
matter of sole executive agreements).
56. See, e.g., Manoharan v. Rajapaksa, 711 F.3d 178, 179–80 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (applying the customary international law doctrine of head-of-state
immunity to justify dismissal of a claim against Sri Lanka’s head of state).
57. Judicial application of customary international law that has been
incorporated into a federal statute is generally consistent with democratic
principles. See infra notes 327–33 and accompanying text (discussing Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)).
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C. Constitutionalization and Judicial Supremacy

Constitutionalization is the process whereby constitutional
law displaced other sources of law as the dominant public law
discourse in federal courts. As the public law litigation system
has become increasingly constitutionalized, federal courts have
increasingly relied on constitutional law as the primary source of
law to resolve public law controversies.58
The term “judicial supremacy” describes a system in which
“judges have the last word when it comes to constitutional
interpretation and . . . their decisions determine the meaning of
the Constitution for everyone.”59 Constitutionalization and
judicial supremacy are not necessarily connected. In theory, the
United States could have a system of judicial supremacy without
constitutionalization. In that case, courts would determine the
meaning of the Constitution, but they would apply the
Constitution only rarely. Alternatively, we could have
constitutionalization without judicial supremacy. In that case,
courts would apply the Constitution to resolve most public law
controversies presented for judicial decision, but other
government actors would not be bound by judicial interpretations
of the Constitution (except that parties would be bound by
decisions in cases where they are parties).
Professor Kramer has shown that judicial supremacy did not
become an entrenched feature of the U.S. constitutional system
until the period between the Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in
Cooper v. Aaron60 and Edwin Meese’s 1986 speech advocating a
departmental theory of constitutional interpretation.61 As shown
in Figure Three below, this is roughly the same period when
constitutional law discourse became firmly established as the
dominant public law discourse in the United States.
If the U.S. legal system had developed constitutionalization
without judicial supremacy, then judicial review would not
threaten popular sovereignty because popularly elected
58. See infra Part III.D (discussing the constitutionalization of American
public law).
59. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 125.
60. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
61. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 220–21.
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legislatures could reject the Supreme Court’s constitutional
rulings. Similarly, if the United States had developed judicial
supremacy without constitutionalization, popular sovereignty
would not be threatened because most judicial review would be
based on statutes, international law, common law, or a
combination of the three. In that case, democratically elected
legislatures would retain the power to modify the governing legal
rules. In fact, our system of public law litigation has evolved in a
way that combines constitutionalization with judicial supremacy.
That combination creates significant tension between judicial
review and the principle of popular sovereignty.
Advocates of popular constitutionalism seek to resolve that
tension by rejecting judicial supremacy. Advocates of judicial
supremacy contend that the popular constitutionalist cure is
worse than the disease.62 However, even the most ardent
proponents of judicial supremacy would presumably admit that
the ideal of popular sovereignty is a core ideal of our democratic
system, and that our current, constitutionalized system of public
law litigation creates significant tension between judicial review
and popular sovereignty.
The preceding analysis offers a potential solution to this
dilemma. If we could partially reverse the process of
constitutionalization, and revive the nineteenth century model of
polymorphous public law litigation, then we could preserve the
benefits of judicial review and mitigate the tension between
judicial supremacy and popular sovereignty. I return to this idea
in Part V below. Parts III and IV demonstrate that federal courts
actually applied a polymorphous model of public law litigation
throughout the nineteenth century.

62. See, e.g., Alexander & Solum, supra note 2 at 1636 (“Real popular
constitutionalism—the kind that involves direct popular action as opposed to
legislative or executive supremacy—is both impractical and dangerous.”);
Chemerinsky, supra note 28, at 1024 (“My fear is that popular constitutionalism
will lead future progressive judges to practice judicial restraint at the expense of
enforcing the Constitution to advance liberty and equality.”).
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III. An Empirical Analysis of Constitutionalization

Part
III
presents
an
empirical
analysis
of
constitutionalization. The first section provides an overview of
the databases used for the analysis. The second section discusses
methodology and research design. The third section documents
the Supreme Court’s transition from a private law to a public law
focus. The next section shows that, within the class of public law
cases, constitutional law has displaced other sources of law as the
dominant public law discourse in the Supreme Court. The final
section offers some tentative, possible explanations for the
process of constitutionalization.
A. Creating the Database
Creation of the database used for the empirical analysis of
constitutionalization proceeded in two phases. In phase one, I
segregated public law cases from other cases so that phase two
analysis could focus exclusively on public law cases. Phase one
applied a simple, quick, objective method to review approximately
27,000 Supreme Court cases and identify the public law cases
within the larger universe.
In phase one, classification was based strictly on the identity
of the parties. If all parties to the litigation are private actors, the
case is classified as PP (private law). If a private actor is adverse
to a government actor, the case is classified as PG (public law).63
63. The phase one database includes three types of cases that are neither
PP nor PG. If one of the parties is a foreign state, the case is classified as FS. FS
cases are not “public law” because they do not involve a dispute between a
private party and a domestic government actor. Suits between domestic
government actors, such as a suit between the United States and one of its
constituent states, are classified as GG. GG cases do not qualify as “public law”
because they do not involve a dispute between a private party and a government
actor. Mixed party cases, in which a government actor and a private party are
co-parties, are classified as MP. Classification of MP cases is problematic. Some
MP cases are similar to PG cases because the underlying dispute is between a
private party and a government actor. However, most MP cases involve an
underlying dispute between two private parties that was litigated before an
administrative tribunal. When the tribunal’s decision is appealed to a court, or
the administrative agency sues to enforce the tribunal’s decision, the agency
becomes a co-party with one of the parties to the underlying dispute. Such cases
are like PP cases because the underlying dispute is between private parties.
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The PG classification provided an excellent proxy for identifying
true “public law cases,” as defined above. Phase two of the
analysis confirmed that approximately ninety-eight percent of the
cases correctly classified as PG in phase one are “public law
cases,” as defined herein.64
I divided Supreme Court history from 1801 to 2005 into eight
periods. Period 1 is the Marshall Court (1801–1835) and Period 2
is the Taney Court (1836–1864). The transition between Periods 2
and 3 corresponds with the end of the Civil War and the
appointment of Chief Justice Salmon Chase. Period 3 (1865–
1888) goes from the Civil War to the industrial revolution; it ends
in 1888 when Melville Fuller replaced Morrison Waite as Chief
Justice. Period 4 (1888–1910) covers Melville Fuller’s tenure as
Chief Justice; it includes the beginning of the Lochner era.
Period 5 (1910–1936) covers the remainder of the Lochner
era; it ends with the final term before West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish,65 which overruled Lochner v. New York.66 Period 6
(1936–1954) begins with West Coast Hotel and ends with the last
term before Brown v. Board of Education.67 Brown coincides with
the beginning of the Warren Court. Period 7 (1954–1972) covers
the Warren Court and ends with the last term before Roe v.
Wade.68 The transition from Period 7 to 8 is marked by the
appointments of Chief Justice Warren Burger (1969) and
Associate Justices Rehnquist and Powell (1972), which created a
conservative majority for the first time since 1937. Period 8
(1973–2005) begins with Roe and ends with the final term of the
Because phase one was designed to provide a quick, simple method for
distinguishing between public and private law cases, I chose to exclude all MP
cases from the class of public law cases.
64. In phase two, I selected at random 1,400 PG cases for detailed analysis.
I eliminated 137 of those cases because the initial classification was incorrect.
(They should have been classified as MP or PP. See Appendix, Table One.) I
eliminated twenty-four other cases because there was insufficient information to
perform the detailed phase two analysis. That left 1,239 cases for phase two
analysis. In twenty-seven of those 1,239 cases, there was no allegation of
unlawful government conduct. The other 1,212 cases satisfy the above definition
of public law cases because the private party alleged that the government actor
violated some established legal norm.
65. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
66. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Rehnquist Court. The lines dividing periods are necessarily
somewhat arbitrary. However, there is no reason to believe that
selection of different dividing lines would yield substantially
different results.
Whereas phase one involved “quick and dirty” analysis of
about 27,000 Supreme Court decisions,69 phase two entailed more
detailed analysis of 1,400 PG cases from periods 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and
8. I excluded periods 4 and 5 from the phase two database
because this project examines the contrast between nineteenth
century public law litigation and modern public law litigation. A
follow-up project will examine in greater detail the transition in
periods 4 and 5.
For phase two, I selected a random sample of PG cases from
each of the periods identified above.70 Research assistants and I
analyzed the Supreme Court decisions, the lower court decisions
(when available), and the parties’ arguments. We recorded
information about the type of law invoked by lawyers, lower court
judges, and Supreme Court Justices—including common law,
state law, federal statutes, treaties, customary international law,
and federal constitutional law.71 We documented the frequency
with which lawyers and judges invoked and applied different
types of law in different time periods. We also recorded a large
69. In phase one, student research assistants reviewed every Supreme
Court decision from John Marshall’s first term as Chief Justice until William
Rehnquist’s last term. Students classified every case as PP, PG, FS, GG, or MP.
Supra note 63. To facilitate timely completion, I instructed students to spend no
more than five minutes per case and to resolve doubts in favor of a PG
classification. The latter instruction yielded an overestimate of the number of
PG cases in phase one; that was a deliberate attempt to ensure that no PG cases
were excluded from the universe from which I drew a random sample in phase
two. Subsequently, I did an error analysis to compensate for the initial
overestimate. See Appendix, Table One.
70. Phase two analysis is based on a random sample of 360 PG cases from
period 8, 240 PG cases from period 7, and 200 PG cases each from periods 1, 2,
3, and 6.
71. For periods 6 to 8, two students reviewed every sample case and
entered information into an Excel file in accordance with my detailed
instructions. Students compared their entries to each others’ and referred
disagreements to me. I reviewed the Excel files for consistency and accuracy.
For periods 1 to 3, I reviewed the cases myself and entered data into Excel files.
The nineteenth century jurisprudence is sufficiently unfamiliar to most law
students that I could not rely on student research assistants to enter accurate
information about nineteenth century cases.
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volume of other information for every case in the phase two
database.72 The phase two database enables one to derive a
quantitative measurement of the extent to which constitutional
law has displaced other sources of law as the dominant discourse
in public law cases.
B. Methodology and Research Design
Part III of this Article employs quantitative analysis, but
presents the data in a way that is accessible to readers with no
training in statistical methods. To make the analysis accessible, I
present the data in graphic form, with very few numbers. The
Appendix contains detailed tables supporting the information
presented graphically in Part III. The text and footnotes in Part
III identify the findings that are statistically significant. Given
the basic choice of a “soft empiricist” methodology, there are two
potential objections to project design that merit a response:
(1) the definition of “public law” excludes many cases that should
be included; and (2) the focus on Supreme Court cases excludes a
large body of public law litigation in state courts. I address these
issues below.
1. The Definition of Public Law (Revisited)
Courts often perform judicial review in private law cases. For
example, in a dispute between private parties, where one party
invokes a state statute to support its position, the opposing party
may argue that the statute is unconstitutional, or that federal
law preempts the statute.73 If the court rules on the validity of
state law, it is engaging in judicial review. However, such cases
are excluded from phase two analysis because they were
72. The data for phases one and two is recorded in Excel files that are
available upon request. The instructions provided to research assistants are also
available upon request.
73. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004) (holding,
in a suit between private parties, that ERISA preempted Texas Health Care
Liability Act); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 643 (2000) (holding, in a
suit between private parties, that a New Jersey statute violated First
Amendment).
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classified as PP in phase one: a dispute between private parties.
Thus, exclusion of PP cases from phase two excludes some cases
involving judicial review.
Nevertheless, exclusion of PP cases from phase two analysis
is justified. First, inclusion of PP cases in the universe from
which a random sample was selected would have created serious
problems. The Supreme Court’s nineteenth century docket
included more PP than PG cases, whereas the Court’s twentieth
century docket included more PG than PP cases.74 The project
was designed to compare nineteenth century public law litigation
to modern public law litigation. If the random sample drew from
a universe comprising all PP and PG cases, the sample would
have been weighted more toward PP cases in the nineteenth
century and more toward PG cases in the twentieth century.
Given the generic differences between private law and public law
litigation,75 this would have produced an “apples to oranges”
comparison, instead of an “apples to apples” comparison.
Moreover, the project was designed to test the hypothesis
that the nineteenth century Supreme Court applied international
law more frequently than it applied constitutional law. During
the nineteenth century, the Court often applied international law
to help resolve disputes between private parties.76 Hence, if one
drew a sample from a universe comprising all PP and PG cases,
the PP cases would likely skew the results for the nineteenth
century in favor of international law because the nineteenth
century Supreme Court probably applied international law more
frequently than it applied constitutional law to resolve disputes
between private parties.77 Therefore, PP cases are excluded from
phase two to avoid skewing the results.

74. See infra Figure One (graphing the percentage of public law and
private law cases on the Supreme Court docket); Appendix, Table One
(providing data that supports Figure One).
75. Supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text.
76. See generally CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 18 (documenting the
Supreme Court’s application of international law from the Founding to the
present).
77. I thank Professor Paul Stephan for identifying this issue during early
discussions about project design.
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2. Public Law Litigation in State Courts
I constructed the project database by reviewing U.S. Supreme
Court decisions. Phase two analysis included review of state court
and lower federal court decisions that were appealed to the Supreme
Court. However, state court decisions that never reached the
Supreme Court are excluded from both phase one and phase two
databases. Exclusion of such decisions is potentially significant
because state courts handle a lot of public law litigation. In the
nineteenth century, there was a rich tradition of public law litigation
in state courts.78 It is questionable whether international law was
ever the dominant public law discourse in state courts, even in the
nineteenth century.79 Thus, the empirical evidence supports the claim
that international law was the dominant public law discourse in
federal courts before the Civil War,80 but it does not support any
empirical claim about public law litigation in state courts in the
nineteenth century.
Hence, one could argue that exclusion of state court cases
presents a distorted picture of nineteenth century public law
litigation. Nevertheless, that exclusion is justified. First, the project
focuses on the constitutionalization of American public law. The U.S.
Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on federal constitutional law to
78. See generally JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS:
PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 123–43 (2012).
79. Figure Seven below shows that international law was never the
dominant discourse in public law cases involving claims against state and local
government actors. Most public law claims against federal government actors
have traditionally been litigated in federal court, not state court. Because
international law never featured prominently in public law claims against state
and local government actors, one could reasonably infer that the international
law discourse that prevailed in federal courts in the pre-Civil War era was not
as prevalent in state courts during that period.
80. One might object that the empirical evidence merely supports claims
about the Supreme Court, not lower federal courts. However, unlike the modern
Court, the nineteenth century Supreme Court had very little control over the
types of cases it received from the lower federal courts. See Carolyn Shapiro, A
“Progressive Contraction of Jurisdiction”: The Making of the Modern Supreme
Court, in THEN & NOW: STORIES OF LAW AND PROGRESS 80, 81 (Lori B. Andrews &
Sarah K. Harding eds., 2013), available at http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.
edu/docs_125/14 (“Cases were appealed to the Supreme Court as of right, unlike
today.”). Therefore, a random sample of sufficient numbers of Supreme Court
decisions should provide a fairly accurate picture of the types of claims raised in
lower federal courts in the nineteenth century.
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resolve public law controversies is problematic because application of
federal constitutional law exacerbates the tension between judicial
review and popular sovereignty. In contrast, application of state
constitutional law by state supreme courts is more consistent with
principles of popular sovereignty.81 Therefore, application of state law
by state courts is tangential to the concerns about the antidemocratic
effects of constitutionalization that motivate this project.
Second, an attempt to collect systematic, quantitative data about
public law litigation in fifty state supreme courts over two hundred
years would face tremendous practical obstacles. Many state supreme
court decisions are unpublished, especially in older cases.
Quantitative analysis cannot readily account for unpublished
decisions. Exclusion of unpublished decisions would introduce bias
into the results, and it would be difficult to assess the magnitude or
directionality of that bias. Apart from concerns about biased data, the
volume of potentially relevant decisions is enormous. Hence,
expansion of the project to encompass state supreme court decisions
would not have been feasible in a reasonable time frame.
C. The Transition from Private Law to Public Law
Figure One summarizes the main results of phase one data
analysis.82 Between 1801 and 1888, more than 60% of the Supreme
81. Compared to federal constitutional law, state constitutional law is
relatively easy to alter by populist means. America’s “fifty states have held 233
constitutional conventions [and] adopted 146 constitutions” since 1776. JOHN J.
DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 1 (2006). In contrast,
the federal government has not convened a constitutional convention since 1787.
Id. Moreover, it is much easier to amend state constitutions than the U.S.
Constitution. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional
Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 248–49 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
Whereas democratic majorities can overrule state court constitutional decisions
by amending the state’s constitution, it is practically impossible for democratic
majorities to overrule a federal constitutional decision by amending the U.S.
Constitution.
82. Figure One summarizes the results of phase one analysis, but the
numbers are adjusted to correct for errors in phase one data. See Appendix,
Table One, for an explanation of the error analysis. All point estimates in Figure
One represent the midpoints of the estimated range of values. The “public law”
category includes all cases classified as PG, including cases that were eventually
excluded from phase two because they did not satisfy the definition of “public
law cases.” Supra notes 64 & 69. The “other” category includes cases classified
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Court’s cases were private law cases. Since 1936, public law cases
have occupied more than 65% of the Supreme Court docket. The shift
from private law to public law is significant because it multiplies the
effect of constitutionalization. The quantitative analysis summarized
in Figures Three to Seven below measures judicial reliance on
constitutional law as a percentage of public law cases. Figure One
shows that the percentage of public law cases on the Supreme Court
docket has increased over time. Hence, if one measured judicial
reliance on constitutional law as a percentage of the Court’s total
caseload, instead of measuring it as a percentage of public law cases,
the degree of constitutionalization would be even greater.83
Figure One
The Percentage of Public Law and Private Law Cases on the Supreme
Court Docket
80%
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PG (Public Law)
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as FS, GG, and MP. Supra note 63.
83. This statement assumes that the Court is more likely to apply
constitutional law in public law cases than in private law cases. I have not
tested that assumption empirically, but I am fairly confident it is correct.
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In addition to recording the split between private and public
law, phase one data also shows the division, within the class of
PG cases, between cases involving federal government actors and
those involving state and local government actors. Figure Two
shows that the proportion of federal cases on the Supreme Court
docket has declined, while the proportion of “state/local” cases has
increased.84
In the pre-Civil War era, most public law cases involved
federal government actors. From the 1860s to the 1970s (periods
3 to 7), the ratio of federal cases to state/local cases was fairly
even and fairly constant, except during period 6, when federal
cases predominated. Period 8, from 1972 to 2005, is the only
period when the Supreme Court decided more state/local cases
than federal cases.85
The increasing percentage of state/local cases on the
Supreme Court docket is significant because the Court has
always relied more heavily on constitutional law in state/local
cases than in federal cases.86 Thus, the rising percentage of
state/local cases on the Court’s docket provides a partial
explanation for constitutionalization. However, as illustrated in
Figures Six and Seven below, there is evidence of
constitutionalization within the class of federal cases, and
separately within the class of state/local cases. Therefore, the
increasing percentage of state/local cases, and the corresponding
84. “Federal” cases are those in which a federal government actor is a
party, regardless of whether the case originated in federal court. “State/local”
cases are those in which a state or local government actor is a party, regardless
of whether the case originated in state court.
85. In phase one, all PG cases were further categorized based on the
identity of the government party. The five sub-categories are federal, state,
local, territorial (for cases involving a territorial government), or mixed (where
federal and state government actors were co-parties). If state and local
government actors are co-parties, the case is coded as “state.” The “other”
category in Figure Two includes territorial cases and mixed cases. Unlike Figure
One, the data in Figure Two does not incorporate an error analysis because the
phase two analysis did not uncover any systematic error in the phase one
categorization of cases as “federal,” “state,” or “local.”
86. See Figure Six (graphing cases involving alleged violations by federal
government actors); Figure Seven (graphing cases involving alleged violations
by state and local government actors); see also Appendix, Table Three (providing
data that supports Figure Six); Appendix, Table Four (providing data that
supports Figure Seven).

POLYMORPHOUS PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION

1785

decline in the percentage of federal cases, does not provide a
complete explanation of constitutionalization.
Figure Two
Percentage of Public Law Cases on the Supreme Court Docket
Involving Federal vs. State and Local Government Actors
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D. The Constitutionalization of American Public Law
Figure Three illustrates the constitutionalization of
American public law.87 It shows that constitutional law has
87. The data in Figure Three is based on the phase two database. The
percentages are estimates of the percentage of public law cases in which the
Supreme Court applied international law and constitutional law, respectively, to
help resolve claims alleging unlawful government conduct. The denominator for
all percentages is the number of cases in the phase two database for a given
period that the Court decided on the merits. The numerator is the number of
those cases in which the Court applied international law, or constitutional law,
or neither international nor constitutional law. See Appendix, Table Two. The
phase two database contains detailed information about the extent to which the
Court relied on common law and state law, as well as international law and
federal constitutional law. Because courts and litigants invoke federal statutes
in almost all public law cases, the database does not record reliance on federal
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displaced other sources of law as the dominant public law
discourse in federal courts. Figure Three also shows that in the
pre-Civil War era, international law claims prevailed over
constitutional claims and international law was the main source
of nonstatutory law that the Court applied to decide public law
cases.
Figure Three
Percentage of Supreme Court Decisions in Public Law Cases In
Which the Court Applied Constitutional Versus International Law
80.0%
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The quantitative difference between judicial application of
international law and constitutional law is statistically
significant for every period shown in Figure Three, except period
3. The difference between judicial application of constitutional
law and “neither international nor constitutional law” is
statistically significant for every period except period 6. The
statutes, except to show cases where courts and litigants did not invoke any
source of law other than federal statutes. The database does not distinguish
between statutes and regulations for this purpose.
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difference between international law and the “neither” category is
not statistically significant in periods 1 and 2, but is statistically
significant in later periods.88
Figure Three illustrates the decline of polymorphous judicial
review and the corresponding rise of constitutionalization since
World War II. The Figure shows that the Court applied a
polymorphous model from the Founding until about the 1950s.
Even in period 6, after judicial reliance on international law had
waned, the Court decided approximately 45–60% of its public law
cases by applying sources other than constitutional law.89
However, during and after the Warren Court, constitutional law
eclipsed every other source of law as the dominant public law
discourse in the Supreme Court.
Figures Four and Five show that the type of law applied by
courts is consistent with the type of law invoked by private
parties. Courts typically apply international law to decide cases
where private parties allege international law violations by
government
actors.
Similarly,
courts
typically
apply
constitutional law to decide cases where private parties allege
constitutional law violations by government actors. Thus,
perhaps lawyers, not judges, have driven the trend toward
greater constitutionalization of public law. On the other hand,
lawyers typically invoke arguments that they think have the best
chance of winning. Therefore, lawyers’ tendency to rely more on
constitutional law in later historical periods probably reflects
their judgment about the receptivity of courts to different types of
legal arguments.90
In Figure Four, there is no statistically significant difference
among the three discrete measurements within a particular time
88. Throughout this Article, the statement that a measurement is
statistically significant means that it is significant at a 95% confidence level.
See Appendix, Table Two for estimates of confidence intervals associated with
the data depicted in Figures Three, Four, and Five.
89. Appendix, Table Two.
90. For Figures Four and Five, the percentage of cases where the private
party raised an international law claim, or a constitutional law claim, is
calculated as a percentage of the total cases in the database for that period. In
contrast, the percentage for judicial decisions is calculated as a percentage of
decisions on the merits in a given time period. The “court below” in Figures Four
and Five is the last court to address the case before it reached the Supreme
Court. See Appendix, Table Two.
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period. Whether one uses Supreme Court decisions, lower court
decisions, or private party claims as a metric to measure reliance
on
international
law,
the
results
are
statistically
indistinguishable within a particular time period. Similarly, in
Figure Five, there is no statistically significant difference among
the three discrete measurements of reliance on constitutional law
within a particular time period.
Figure Four—The Decline of International Law
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Looking at changes over time for international law (Figure
Four), there was no statistically significant difference between
periods 1 and 2 or between periods 6, 7, and 8. However, there
was a statistically significant decline in reliance on international
law between periods 2 and 3 and again between periods 3 and 6.91
With respect to Figure Five, there was a statistically significant
increase in reliance on constitutional law from period 1 to 3, from
period 3 to 6, and from period 6 to 8.92 However, the differences

91.
92.

See Appendix, Table Two.
For the transition from period 1 to 3, the rise in private party claims
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between adjacent periods in Figure Five are not statistically
significant.
Figures Three and Five demonstrate that constitutional law
has displaced other sources of law as the dominant public law
discourse in the Supreme Court. Or, to state the point differently,
the constitutionalized model of public law litigation has
supplanted the polymorphous model of public law litigation that
prevailed in the nineteenth century.
Figure Five—The Rise of Constitutional Law
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If one divides public law cases between federal cases and
state/local cases, a somewhat different picture emerges. Figures
Six and Seven, respectively, present data about public law cases

based on constitutional law is not quite statistically significant at the 95%
confidence level. However, the other two measures are statistically significant at
the 95% level. For the transitions from period 3 to 6, and from period 6 to 8, all
three measures are statistically significant. See Appendix, Table Two.
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involving alleged violations by federal government actors, 93 and
by state and local government actors. 94
A comparison between Figures Six and Seven is illuminating.
First, note that federal courts have always relied more heavily on
constitutional law in state/local cases than in federal cases.95 For
state/local cases, reliance on constitutional law ranged from a low
of about 43% in periods 2 and 3, to a high of about 90% in periods
6 and 7. In contrast, for federal cases, reliance on constitutional
law ranged from a low of less than 10% in periods 1 to 3, to a high
of about 50% in period 8.
Second, note that constitutionalization occurred earlier for
state and local cases than it did for federal cases. As shown in
Figure Seven, litigation of state/local cases became heavily
constitutionalized somewhere between periods 3 and 6. However,
as shown in Figure Six, litigation of federal cases did not really
become constitutionalized until period 8.96
Third, note the difference between federal cases and
state/local cases in the nineteenth century regarding application
of international law. International law claims accounted for about
44% of federal cases in period 1, 56% of federal cases in period 2,
and 22% of federal cases in period 3.97 In contrast, international
claims never accounted for more than 10% of the state/local cases

93. In Figure Six, the denominator for all percentages is the number of
federal cases in the phase two database for a given period that the Court
decided on the merits. The numerator is the number of those cases in which the
Court applied international law, or constitutional law, or neither international
nor constitutional law. See Appendix, Table Three.
94. In Figure Seven, the percentages are calculated in the same way as in
Figure Six, except that the numerators and denominators include state/local
cases, instead of federal cases. See Appendix, Table Four. In period 1, there were
very few public law cases involving claims against state and local government
actors. Supra Figure Two. In Figures Seven and Eight, where state/local cases
are segregated from federal cases, I did not include data for period 1 for
state/local cases because there were too few cases to support any significant
findings.
95. This proposition is also true if one uses private party claims, rather
than judicial decisions, as a metric for measuring reliance on constitutional law.
See Appendix, Tables Three and Four.
96. Data for periods 4 and 5 is absent, but it is unlikely that the percentage
of federal cases in which the Court applied constitutional law was higher in
period 4 or 5 than it was in periods 6 and 7.
97. See Appendix, Table Three.
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in any period.98 For the federal cases depicted in Figure Six, there
was a statistically significant decline in reliance on international
law between periods 2 and 3 and again between periods 3 and 6.99
For the state/local cases displayed in Figure Seven, there was no
statistically significant change in reliance on international law
across time periods. The Supreme Court has never relied heavily
on international law to decide state/local cases.
Figure Six
Alleged Violations by Federal Government Actors
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Focusing on Figure Six, it bears emphasis that the
polymorphous model prevailed for federal cases from the
Founding until the 1970s.100 Before the Civil War, most claims
against federal officers involved international law, common law,
and statutes.101 In period 3, immediately after the Civil War,
98. See Appendix, Table Four.
99. See Appendix, Table Three.
100. Here, I use the term “polymorphous” to refer to the fact that, for federal
cases, non-constitutional claims prevailed over constitutional claims until the
1970s.
101. The “neither” category includes both common law and statutory claims.
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statutory and common law claims supplanted international law
claims to some extent. Even so, litigants who raised claims against
federal government actors in period 3 were more likely to frame
those claims in terms of international law, not constitutional law.102
There was a statistically significant increase in the percentage of
constitutional law claims between periods 3 and 6. However, in both
periods 6 and 7, the Supreme Court was much more likely to decide
claims against federal government actors by applying statutes,
rather than constitutional law.103
Figure Seven
Alleged Violations by State and Local Government Actors
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102. For federal cases in period 3, using private party claims as a metric,
there was a statistically significant difference between the incidence of
international law and constitutional law claims. However, using Supreme Court
decisions as a metric, the difference between international law cases and
constitutional law cases was not (quite) statistically significant at the 95% level.
See Appendix, Table Three.
103. Common law claims largely disappeared near the beginning of period 6,
due to the Supreme Court decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938). The incidence of international law claims declined significantly
between periods 3 and 6. See Appendix, Table Three. Hence, in periods 6 to 8,
most federal cases involved either statutes or constitutional law.
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E. The Decline of the Polymorphous Model of Public Law
Litigation
The last subpart analyzed the type of law courts apply in
public law cases, emphasizing the distinction between
international and constitutional law. To assess the tension
between judicial review and popular sovereignty, it is also
important to consider the nature of the government conduct being
challenged. Compare claims challenging legislative action to
those challenging executive or administrative action. Judicial
decisions invalidating statutes exacerbate the tension between
judicial review and popular sovereignty because the court applies
its judicial power to invalidate a law adopted by majority vote in
a popularly elected legislature.104 In contrast, a judicial decision
holding that an unelected government officer violated a statute is
broadly consistent with principles of popular sovereignty: the
court applies its judicial power to ensure that the government
officer complies with a law created by a democratic process. 105
Several permutations are possible, depending on the type of
government conduct being challenged, the source of the legal
norm applied, and other factors. The central point is that claims
challenging the validity of legislation tend to exacerbate the
tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty. In
contrast, claims challenging the legality of executive or
administrative action typically raise fewer concerns about
conflicts between judicial review and popular sovereignty.
Figure Eight depicts changes over time in the percentage of
public law cases challenging legislative action. The data in Figure
Eight is based on claims and defenses raised by private parties,
not judicial decisions by courts. Specific points are estimates of
the percentage of cases in a given period where private parties
raised claims or defenses challenging the validity of legislation.
Focus first on the middle line, which is an aggregate figure for all
public law cases. There was a statistically significant increase in
cases challenging legislation between periods 3 and 6. However,
104. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013)
(holding that the federal Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional).
105. See, e.g., PPL Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 133 S. Ct. 1897,
1903–07 (2013) (holding, in suit against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
that a corporate taxpayer had a statutory entitlement to a tax credit).
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there was no statistically significant change in the rate at which
private parties challenged legislation across periods 1 to 3 or
across periods 6 to 8.106
The top and bottom lines in Figure Eight divide public law
cases between federal cases and state/local cases. The pattern for
federal cases is similar to the pattern for total cases. There was a
statistically significant increase in cases challenging federal
legislation from periods 3 to 6. However, there was no
statistically significant change in the rate at which private
parties challenged federal legislation from periods 1 to 3 or from
periods 6 to 8.107 Before 1888, private parties rarely raised claims
or defenses challenging the validity of federal legislation. In the
nineteenth century, most public law litigation with federal
government actors involved challenges to federal executive or
administrative action.108
The top line in Figure Eight depicts the percentage of
state/local cases where private parties challenged the validity of
state or local legislation.109 The contrast with federal cases is
striking. Even in the nineteenth century, cases challenging state
or local legislation were quite common. Indeed, there was no
statistically significant change in the percentage of state/local
cases challenging legislation across periods 2, 3, 7, and 8. In
period 6, there was a statistically significant increase in cases
challenging state and local legislation.110 The sharp, temporary
rise in period 6 may have been a remnant from the Lochner era.
The Supreme Court may have purposefully granted certiorari in
numerous cases to reject Lochner-type claims challenging state or
local legislation.111
106. See Appendix, Table Five. The increase from period 1 to period 3 is not
quite statistically significant at the 95% level.
107. See Appendix, Table Five.
108. In periods 1–3, fewer than 5% of federal cases involved challenges to
legislative action. See Appendix, Table Five.
109. As noted above, the separate data on state/local cases does not include
data for period 1. Supra note 95.
110. The total number of state/local cases in the phase two database for
periods 2, 3, 6, and 7 is fairly small. Nevertheless, the spike in cases challenging
state and local legislation in period 6 is statistically significant. See Appendix,
Table Five.
111. At least one other fact supports this hypothesis. The phase two
database shows that private parties had a lower winning percentage in the
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Figure Eight
Public Law Cases Challenging the Validity of Legislation
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The data summarized in Figure Nine combines information
about the type of government conduct challenged (shown in
Figure Eight) with information about the type of legal claim
raised (shown in Figures Four and Five). A claim is classified as
countermajoritarian if the private party both raised a
constitutional claim and challenged the validity of legislation. A
claim is classified as majoritarian if the private party neither
raised a constitutional claim nor challenged the validity of
legislation. Like Figure Eight, Figure Nine presents information
about claims raised by private parties, not judicial decisions by
courts.112
Supreme Court in period 6 than at any other time in Supreme Court history.
The database is available from the author upon request.
112. In Figure Nine, the denominator for each percentage is the total
number of cases in the phase two database for that period. The numerator is the
number of cases in each period satisfying the above definitions of “majoritarian”
and “counter-majoritarian” claims, respectively. See Appendix, Table Five.
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Figure Nine
The Decline of the Majoritarian Model
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Figure Nine shows that there has been a sharp, steady
decline in the percentage of public law cases involving
majoritarian claims. To reiterate, a case is classified as
majoritarian if the private party neither challenges legislation
nor raises a constitutional law argument. The combination of
lawyers’ increasing reliance on constitutional law to frame
arguments in public law cases,113 and their growing tendency to
challenge the validity of legislation,114 explains the steady decline
in majoritarian claims. The percentage of public law cases
involving majoritarian claims dropped from a high of almost 90%
in period 1, to a low of less than 25% in period 8. This steady
decline includes a statistically significant drop from period 3 to 6,
followed by another statistically significant drop from period 6 to
8.115
113.
114.
115.

Supra Figure Five.
Supra Figure Eight.
See Appendix, Table Five. The Appendix also provides data that divides
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In sum, nineteenth century public law litigation generally
conformed to a polymorphous model that minimized the tension
between judicial review and popular sovereignty. Nineteenth
century lawyers who contested the legality of government conduct
usually challenged executive or administrative action, not
legislative action. Moreover, they usually raised claims based on
statutes, international law, or common law, not constitutional
law. In contrast, modern litigants are more likely to challenge
legislative action than their nineteenth century predecessors, and
they are more likely to raise constitutional claims. Greater
reliance on constitutional law, combined with the increasing
tendency to challenge legislative action, means that the modern,
constitutionalized system of public law litigation exacerbates the
tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty.
F. Tentative Explanations for Constitutionalization
Additional empirical analysis of periods 4 and 5 is needed to
provide a detailed explanation of constitutionalization. That is
the subject of a follow-up project. Still, it is possible to venture
some tentative hypotheses.
First, the differences between federal cases and state/local
cases suggest that distinct explanations are required for the two
sets of cases. For state/local cases, the sharp rise in reliance on
constitutional law between periods 3 and 6 may be related to the
development of Lochner jurisprudence in periods 4 and 5.116
Interestingly, though, the repudiation of Lochner at the
beginning of period 6 did not reverse the process of
constitutionalization for state/local cases to any significant
degree.117 During the Lochner era, lawyers and judges became
the information presented in Figures Eight and Nine between federal cases and
state/local cases.
116. For an excellent historical analysis of Lochner era jurisprudence, see
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE,
THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA 11–91 (2000).
117. Data about the degree of constitutionalization in the Lochner era is not
currently available. However, in period 6, after the Court repudiated Lochner,
private parties raised constitutional claims in 92% of the state/local cases, and
the Supreme Court applied constitutional law in 89% of the state/local cases. See
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accustomed to invoking and applying constitutional law to resolve
public law claims against state and local government actors. The
habit apparently persisted after the Court repudiated Lochner.
For federal cases, Figure Six shows a significant decline in
reliance on international law before there was a significant rise in
reliance on constitutional law. Hence, the decline of international
law and the rise of constitutional law require separate
explanations.118 Professor Ramsey has shown that claims
involving customary international law disappeared from the
Supreme Court docket in the early twentieth century.119 He
contends that treaties and statutes supplanted customary
international law in some fields, while constitutional law
displaced customary international law in other areas.
Additionally, “[m]any staples of international law adjudication in
the nineteenth century—pirates, prizes, and privateers—faded or
disappeared altogether.”120
In contrast to customary international law, the Supreme
Court continued to handle numerous treaty cases in the early
twentieth century.121 However, a 1925 amendment to the Judicial
Code altered the rules for Supreme Court jurisdiction over treaty
cases.122 Before 1925, jurisdictional statutes gave litigants an
automatic right of appeal to the Supreme Court in most treaty
cases. The 1925 amendment granted the Supreme Court broad
discretion to refuse to entertain most of those cases.123 The Court
Appendix, Table Four. The corresponding percentages could not have been much
higher, if at all, during the Lochner era.
118. Figure Six shows a decline in international law for federal cases
between periods 2 and 3. The Court’s overall caseload increased from about fiftyfive cases per year in period 2 to about 189 cases per year in period 3. In part,
the growing caseload involved new issues for which international law did not
provide answers. Thus, the declining percentage of international law cases may
be partially attributable to the growth of the Court’s caseload during this period.
119. See Ramsey, supra note 18, at 234–38 (“As the general common law
gained force, customary international law as a distinct proposition began to fade
somewhat in direct application cases.”).
120. Id. at 225.
121. See generally Michael Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court,
1901–1945, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 18, at 191–224.
122. An Act to Amend the Judicial Code, and to Further Define the
Jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of Appeals and of the Supreme Court, and for
Other Purposes, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 936–41 (1925).
123. See generally Van Alstine, supra note 121, at 224; Shapiro, supra note
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apparently used its newly granted discretion to reduce the
number of treaty cases on its docket.
Turning to the Court’s increasing reliance on constitutional
law in federal cases, Figure Six depicts two distinct spikes. The
first spike occurred between periods 3 and 6, when the Court’s
reliance on constitutional law jumped from below ten percent to
almost thirty percent.124 This spike may also be related to
changes in jurisdictional statutes between 1888 and 1925 that
granted the Supreme Court greater control over its docket.125
Figure Ten
Constitutionalization of Federal Cases in the Twentieth Century
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The second spike occurred between periods 7 and 8, when the
Court’s reliance on constitutional law in federal cases increased
from about 31% in period 7 to almost 50% in period 8. One could
hypothesize that the change between periods 7 and 8 was related
to the Court’s increasing focus on cases challenging federal
legislation, as opposed to executive or administrative action.
However, the data in Figure Ten refutes this hypothesis.126
80, at 82–84.
124. See Appendix, Table Three. If one measures private party claims,
rather than Supreme Court decisions, reliance on constitutional law increased
from 6% to 34% between periods 3 and 6. Id.
125. See generally Shapiro, supra note 80, at 81–85.
126. The data in Figure Ten is drawn from Tables Three and Five in the
Appendix. Those tables provide confidence intervals for every estimate. The
notes to those tables explain the derivation of the estimates.

1800

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1757 (2014)

Between period 6 and period 8, the percentage of federal cases in
which private parties challenged legislation remained fairly
constant.127 In contrast, the percentage of federal cases in which
private parties raised constitutional claims increased
significantly between periods 7 and 8, as did the percentage of
federal cases in which the Court applied constitutional law.128
The sharp increase in constitutionalization of claims against
federal government actors after 1972 is an important trend that
has received too little scholarly attention. Further analysis is
necessary to explain this development.
IV. The Forgotten History of Nineteenth Century Public Law
Litigation
Conventional wisdom holds that public law litigation in the
United States is a modern development.129 The novelty of public
law litigation depends partly upon definition of the term. As
defined above, public law cases accounted for a significant portion
of the Supreme Court caseload in the nineteenth century. The
Court decided more than 3,000 public law cases in the nineteenth
century.130 Part IV of this Article presents a narrative account of
the history of nineteenth century public law litigation.
Part IV is divided into four subparts. The first subpart
presents an overview of nineteenth century public law cases
where the Court applied international law. The next two subparts
present case studies to illustrate application of a polymorphous
model of public law litigation. The case studies address: (1) land
claims arising from the 1803 Louisiana treaty and the 1819
Florida treaty; and (2) Chinese immigration cases from 1882 to
1905. The final subpart summarizes key conclusions. The case
studies demonstrate that federal courts can provide robust
protection for individual rights without applying constitutional
law and without invalidating legislation approved by popularly
elected legislatures.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See Appendix, Table Five.
See Appendix, Table Three.
See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 31, at 4.
Appendix, Table One.
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A. Nineteenth Century International Law Claims
Many nineteenth century cases involving judicial application
of international law are private law cases. However, the
nineteenth century Supreme Court also applied international law
to help resolve numerous public law controversies. Broadly
speaking, those public law cases include admiralty, real property,
and other cases. Figure Eleven shows that the mix of
international law cases changed over time.131
During the Marshall Court (period 1), admiralty cases
accounted for about two-thirds of the public law cases where
litigants raised international law claims.132 Most of those
admiralty cases involved allegations that a federal government
agent seized private property in violation of customary
international law. In many cases, the private party invoked
international law as a defense to a prize proceeding or a civil
forfeiture action initiated by the government.133 In other cases,
the private party filed suit against a government actor to obtain
damages or restitution for wrongful seizure of property.134 A few
cases involved criminal prosecutions for piracy.135 Although many
of the Marshall Court admiralty cases were private law

131. The percentages shown in Figure Eleven are estimates based on the
phase two database.
132. See infra Figure Eleven; see generally BENJAMIN MUNN ZIEGLER, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JOHN MARSHALL: A STUDY OF FIRST PRINCIPLES (1939).
133. See, e.g., The Josefa Segunda, 18 U.S. 338, 338–39 (1820) (civil
forfeiture action); The Friendschaft, 16 U.S. 14, 15–16 (1818) (privateer
captured vessel and initiated prize proceeding); The Julia, 12 U.S. 181, 181
(1814) (War of 1812 prize case). The prize cases from this era include some
captures by U.S. naval vessels and some captures by privateers. I count
privateers as government agents if they acted on the basis of a commission
issued by the government.
134. See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 363–64 (1824) (suit for damages
against U.S. customs collector); Maley v. Jared Shattuck, 7 U.S. 458, 492 (1806)
(ordering federal officer to pay restitution for violation of customary
international law). About 25% of the Marshall Court admiralty cases included in
Figure Eleven were initiated by private parties. The remaining 75% were
initiated by government actors.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820); United States v.
Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 610 (1818). In Figure Eleven, piracy cases count as “other,”
not “admiralty,” because they are criminal cases.
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disputes,136 all the cases included in Figure Eleven are public law
cases.
During the Taney Court (period 2), about 90% of the public
law cases where litigants raised international law claims involved
disputes over real property.137 Most of those cases arose under the
1803 treaty acquiring Louisiana from France, or the 1819 treaty
acquiring Florida from Spain.138 Part IV.B addresses land claims
arising from these treaties.
Figure Eleven
Supreme Court Public Law Cases
Involving International Law, 1801–1888
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In the aftermath of the Civil War (period 3), the public law
cases where litigants raised international law claims included a

136. See, e.g., La Nereyda, 21 U.S. 108, 110–14 (1823) (case brought by a
Spanish consul against a private ship); The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546, 546–47
(1818) (case brought by a private foreign ship owner against a private American
ship owner).
137. Infra Figure Eleven.
138. See Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat.
200 [hereinafter Louisiana Treaty]; Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits,
U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252 [hereinafter Florida Treaty].
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mix of admiralty, real property, and other cases.139 The admiralty
cases included many prize cases arising from the Civil War.140
The real property cases included many cases arising from the
treaty acquiring California from Mexico;141 they were broadly
similar to the earlier Louisiana–Florida cases.142 The “other”
cases defy generalization. Many arose under the Abandoned and
Captured Property Act,143 a federal statute that authorized
individuals to file claims against the United States to obtain
compensation for property captured during the Civil War.144
Others involved treaties with Native American tribes,145 Chinese
immigration cases,146 claims against state tax collectors,147
disputes over import duties,148 and a variety of other issues.
B. Land Claims in Florida and Louisiana
The United States acquired Louisiana from France under an
1803 treaty; it acquired Florida from Spain under an 1819 treaty.
Both treaties protected the property rights of individuals who

139. Supra Figure Eleven.
140. E.g., United States v. Farragut, 89 U.S. 406 (1874); The Peterhoff, 72
U.S. 28 (1866).
141. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2,
1848, 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo].
142. See CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, THE TANEY PERIOD: 1836–1864, at 773–810 (1974) (discussing Supreme
Court treaty cases).
143. An Act to Provide for the Collection of Abandoned Property and for the
Prevention of Frauds in Insurrectionary Districts within the United States, ch.
120, 12 Stat. 820, 820–21 (1863).
144. See Elizabeth Lee Thompson, Reconstructing the Practice: The Effects of
Expanded Federal Judicial Power on Postbellum Lawyers, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
306, 306–07 (1999) (discussing the Act and its impact on lawyers and courts).
The Court of Claims decided more than 1,500 cases arising under this statute
between 1868 and 1875. Id. at 307–09. The Supreme Court decided
approximately two-dozen such cases in the decades after the Civil War, many of
which involved application of international law. See Lee & Sloss, supra note 21,
at 131–32.
145. E.g., The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616 (1870).
146. See infra Part IV.C (discussing Chinese habeas litigation).
147. E.g., Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454 (1878).
148. E.g., Cliquot’s Champagne, 70 U.S. 114 (1866).
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owned land under the prior sovereign.149 The treaties restated
principles of customary international law, which held that
transfer of territory between sovereign states does not affect
individual property rights. Chief Justice Marshall summarized
the law as follows:
The people change their allegiance; their relation to their
ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their . . . rights of property,
remain undisturbed. . . . Had Florida changed its sovereign by
an act containing no stipulation respecting the property of
individuals, the right of property in all those who became
subjects or citizens of the new government would have been
unaffected by the change; it would have remained the same as
under the ancient sovereign. . . . The king cedes that only
which belonged to him; lands he had previously granted, were
not his to cede.150

From Marshall’s standpoint, this was not merely a principle of
international law; it was also a matter of fundamental rights. He
said: “That sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged
and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if private
property should be generally confiscated, and private rights
annulled.”151
The principle was easier to state than to apply. Two factors
presented difficulties. First, many claimants produced ostensible
titles tainted by fraud.152 Given widespread allegations of fraud,
Congress established administrative tribunals, known as land
commissions, to distinguish between valid and fraudulent claims,
and provided for judicial review of administrative decisions.153
149. Louisiana Treaty, supra note 138, art. 3; Florida Treaty, supra note
138, art. 8. The 1848 treaty acquiring California from Mexico included a similar
provision. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 141, art. 8.
150. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 87 (1833).
151. Id.
152. See HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS
IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 124–25 (1937)
(discussing fraudulent property claims in the context of treaties transferring
land to the United States).
153. See, e.g., An Act for Ascertaining and Adjusting the Titles and Claims
to Land, Within the Territory of Orleans, and the District of Louisiana, 1805, ch.
26, § 5, 2 Stat. 324, 327–28 (authorizing the President to appoint commissioners
for claims in Louisiana); An Act Enabling the Claimants to Lands Within the
Limits of the State of Missouri and Territory of Arkansas to Institute
Proceedings to Try the Validity of Their Claims, 1824, ch. 173, § 1, 4 Stat. 52
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The laws governing land commissions varied by region, but the
commissions typically reported to Congress, whereupon Congress
enacted statutes confirming individual titles as recommended by
the commissioners.154 Second, the varied practices of French and
Spanish officials who issued land grants before the U.S.
acquisitions of Louisiana and Florida gave rise to a bewildering
array of imperfect, or inchoate, titles.155 Supreme Court doctrine
that developed between 1830 and 1850 established that
individuals who held complete, or perfect, titles before the
relevant treaty of cession did not have to present their claims to
land commissions; the treaties confirmed the validity of perfect
titles.156 However, individuals who held inchoate titles had to
apply to land commissions, pursuant to procedures established by
Congress, before the government would confirm their titles.157
(providing for judicial review of land claims in Missouri); An Act for
Ascertaining Claims and Titles to Land Within the Territory of Florida, 1822,
ch. 129, 3 Stat. 709 (authorizing the President to appoint commissioners for
claims in Florida); An Act Supplementary to the Several Acts Providing for the
Settlement and Confirmation of Private Land Claims in Florida, 1828, ch. 70,
§ 6, 4 Stat. 284 (providing for judicial review of land claims in Florida); see also
An Act For Ascertaining and Adjusting the Titles and Claims to Land, Within
the Territory of Orleans, and the District of Louisiana, 1805, ch. 26, 2 Stat. 324,
324–25 n.(a) (summarizing legislation between 1804 and 1844 relating to land
claims in Louisiana and Florida).
154. See, e.g., An Act for the Confirmation of Certain Claims in the Western
District of Louisiana, and in the Territory of Missouri, 1816, ch. 159, 3 Stat. 328,
328–29 (approving the recommendations of the commissioners in the Louisiana
territory); An Act Confirming the Titles to Lots in the Town of Mobile, and in
the Former Province of West Florida, Which Claims Have Been Favourably
Reported on by the Commissioners Appointed by the United States, 1822, ch.
122, 3 Stat. 699, 699–700 (confirming the recommendations of the
commissioners in the Florida territory).
155. See Harry L. Coles, Jr., Applicability of the Public Land System to
Louisiana, 43 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 39, 41 (1956) (discussing the problematic
way territorial land was divided prior to becoming part of the United States).
156. David Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to
Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 135, 150–51 (2012); see
also United States v. Roselius, 56 U.S. 31, 34 (1853) (“[N]or was jurisdiction
vested in the District Courts to adjudge the validity of perfect titles.”);
McDonogh v. Millaudon, 44 U.S. 693, 706 (1845) (“The perfect title of McDonogh
being clothed with the highest sanction, and in full property, on the change of
governments an assumption to confirm it would have been pregnant with
suspicion that it required confirmation by this government . . . .”).
157. See, e.g., Menard’s Heirs v. Massey, 49 U.S. 293, 306–07 (1850)
(“Boards of Commissioners were created, with liberal powers . . . and by this
means many claims were confirmed, the legal title added, and incipient
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Between 1830 and 1860, the Supreme Court decided
approximately one hundred cases involving land disputes arising
from the Louisiana and Florida treaties.158 Some were private
disputes between private parties,159 but most were public law
disputes between the United States and individuals who asserted
titles based on French or Spanish grants. “In the whole of the
Louisiana Purchase, there were between 13,000 and 14,000 such
claims.”160 Claims arising from the Louisiana Purchase covered
about seven million acres.161 Supreme Court decisions in the
Florida cases affected “fifteen million acres . . . covering about
one-third of the state.”162 The stakes were high because, during
this period, “for all the growth of industry and steady
accumulation of capital in other forms, land was the principal
form and source of wealth in the country.”163
1. The Role of International Law
Litigants in the Louisiana–Florida land cases routinely
invoked rights protected by international law. Federal statutes
governed the procedural rules, but claimants’ substantive rights
depended on foreign and international law. In most cases, French
or Spanish law determined the validity of the initial land
grant.164 However, neither French nor Spanish law protected
concessions completed into perfect and conclusive titles against the
government.”); United States v. Wiggins, 39 U.S. 334, 350 (1840) (“But that
there were at the date of the treaty very many claims, whose validity depended
upon the performance of conditions in consideration of which the concessions
had been made, . . . is a fact rendered prominently notorious by the legislation of
Congress and the litigation in the Courts . . . .”).
158. See SWISHER, supra note 142, at 747 (stating that “controversies over
land titles in the Louisiana Purchase gave rise to some fifty major cases in the
Supreme Court . . . . From Florida the Supreme Court also decided some fifty
cases”).
159. E.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
160. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 152, at 120. There are no reliable
estimates of the number of claims under the Florida treaty, but that treaty
probably gave rise to a comparable number of claims.
161. Id. at 120.
162. SWISHER, supra note 142, at 747–48.
163. Id. at 747.
164. In a few cases, the Court determined that a Spanish grant was invalid
because Spain purported to grant land to someone after the United States
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individuals from adverse claims by the federal government. In
every case, the individual’s substantive rights vis-à-vis the
United States depended on treaties, customary international law,
or both. Under international law, any individual who had a valid
claim against the French or Spanish government before the
treaty of cession had an equally valid claim against the United
States after the change of sovereignty.165 Conventional wisdom
holds that nineteenth century international law did not protect
U.S. citizens from their own government. That view is mistaken.
The Louisiana–Florida cases rarely specify the citizenship of
claimants, but many of them were undoubtedly U.S. citizens.
Moreover, citizenship was irrelevant. Both citizens and noncitizens were protected by the relevant rules of international law.
The Supreme Court decision in United States v. Arredondo166
is illustrative. The grant at issue in Arredondo “covered an area
of 289,645 acres . . . . It embraced nearly the entire northeastern
coast of Florida, including Jacksonville and other cities.”167
Former Attorney General William Wirt and Attorney General
Roger Taney argued the case for the government. Former
Attorney General John Berrien and Daniel Webster represented
the private claimants.168 “The government attacked the claim as
fraudulent, denied the legal power of the Cuban army intendant
to make the grant, [and] argued that the lands were within the
Indian boundary and not subject to grant.”169 The Supreme Court
rejected all these arguments, ruling decisively for the private
claimants. The Court emphasized that “[t]he treaty and the acts

acquired sovereignty. See, e.g., Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. 511, 521 (1838) (“[I]t
would seem that to follow as a necessary consequence, that the grant . . . which
was made by the Spanish authorities within the limits of the territory which
then belonged to the United States, must be null and void.”). In such cases, the
initial grant was invalid not because of Spanish law, but because Spain did not
have sovereignty over the property it purported to grant. See id. (“It is obvious
that one nation cannot grant away the territory of another . . . .”).
165. See, e.g., Wiggins, 39 U.S. at 350 (“[T]he United States were bound,
after the cession of the country, to the same extent that Spain had been bound
before the ratification of the treaty . . . .”).
166. 31 U.S. 691 (1832).
167. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 152, at 126.
168. Id. at 127.
169. Id.
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of Congress were to be liberally construed, [and] the acts of
foreign public officers were presumed to be lawful.”170
Later commentators noted that Arredondo “served as the
most important legal precedent for the entire body of Louisiana,
Florida, and later California land cases.”171 Arredondo
established a key legal precedent for protecting property rights
from government infringement. However, the Court did not apply
constitutional law to protect individuals from government
overreaching. Instead, the Court applied international and
foreign law to constrain federal executive power.172 Summarizing
the body of precedent derived from Arredondo, the Supreme
Court later said, “the claims shall be adjudged, and the equities
of the claimants determined and settled according to the law of
nations, the stipulations of the treaty, and . . . the laws and
ordinances of the government from which the claims are alleged
to have been derived.”173 In short, the Court applied a
polymorphous model, drawing on multiple sources of law to
resolve individual claims against the government.
Private litigants had great success litigating property claims
against the federal government. Between 1832 and 1836, Joseph
Mills White, the foremost U.S. expert on Spanish land law,
represented private claimants before the Supreme Court in
twenty-four cases involving the Louisiana and Florida treaties.174
He won a partial or total victory in twenty-three of twenty-four
cases,175 relying on international and foreign law to protect
individual rights from government encroachment. Few, if any,
modern Supreme Court litigators can claim a comparable success
rate.

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 691, 725–32 (1832) (referencing
Spanish law and international law in deciding a land dispute in favor of a
private claimant and against the United States).
173. United States v. Wiggins, 39 U.S. 334, 350 (1840).
174. See generally ERNEST F. DIBBLE, JOSEPH MILLS WHITE: ANTI-JACKSONIAN
FLORIDIAN 173–81 (2003).
175. Id. at 134, 173–81.
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2. The Mobile Waterfront Cases
Between 1840 and 1850, the Court decided seven cases
involving waterfront property in Mobile, Alabama.176 Those cases
affected title to “a most valuable portion, and a very large portion,
of the second [largest] city on the Gulf of Mexico, in wealth and
population.”177 They are doctrinally important because the Court
held in two of these cases that certain federal statutes were
void.178 They are the only two cases in the entire line of Florida,
Louisiana, and California land claims where the Court
invalidated a federal statute.
The city of Mobile is located in a region that was subject to a
territorial dispute between the United States and Spain from
1803 to 1819. Spain claimed the territory as part of Florida. The
United States claimed that it acquired the land from France in
1803 as part of Louisiana. The dispute was not resolved until the
United States acquired Florida from Spain in 1819.179
Despite the United States’ claim of sovereignty, Spain
exercised de facto control over Mobile and surrounding areas
until about October 1810, when the President “ordered military
possession to be taken of the disputed territory.”180 Between 1803
and 1810, Spanish authorities issued numerous land grants in
the region. The Supreme Court consistently held that Spanish
grants in the disputed territory after 1803 did not convey legal
title because Spain did not have de jure sovereignty.181 However,
176. Goodtitle ex dem Pollard v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. 471 (1850); Pollard v. Hagan,
44 U.S. 212 (1845); Pollard’s Lessee v. Files, 43 U.S. 591 (1844); City of Mobile
v. Emanuel, 42 U.S. 95 (1843); City of Mobile v. Hallett, 41 U.S. 261, 263 (1842);
City of Mobile v. Eslava, 41 U.S. 234 (1842); Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S.
353 (1840). The four “Pollard” cases were private disputes; the three “City of
Mobile” cases were public law cases. I address all seven cases together because
they are all related.
177. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 233 (1845) (Catron, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 224–25 (majority opinion); Goodtitle ex dem Pollard v. Kibbe, 50
U.S. 471, 478 (1850).
179. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 300–09 (1829) (explaining the
history of the dispute).
180. Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353, 370 (1840) (Baldwin, J.,
concurring).
181. See e.g., Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. 511, 520–21 (1838) (citing Foster to
support the conclusion that a Spanish grant made in 1806 was invalid); Foster,
27 U.S. at 303–09 (holding that the Spanish grant was void).
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the Court concluded that Spain’s de facto control gave it the
“power to grant” inchoate titles.182 Moreover, the United States
had an obligation under customary international law to respect
the inchoate property rights of Spanish grantees,183 and Congress
had power to grant legal titles to individuals who held inchoate
rights based on Spanish grants.184 Congress “in more than a
thousand instances respected and confirmed such titles,”185
relying implicitly on this chain of reasoning.
In five of the Mobile waterfront cases, the Court affirmed the
validity of land titles based on a combination of Spanish grants
and federal legislation. In Pollard’s Lessee v. Files186 and Pollard’s
Heirs v. Kibbe,187 the Court affirmed land titles based on an 1809
Spanish grant to William Pollard; an 1824 federal statute
conveying U.S. property rights to the city of Mobile, but
preserving the rights of individuals who obtained Spanish grants
“during the time at which [Spain] had the power to grant the
same”;188 and an 1836 federal statute confirming the title of “the
182. Pollard’s Heirs, 39 U.S. at 364–66; Pollard’s Lessee v. Files, 43 U.S.
591, 602–05 (1844).
183. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. Some Justices argued
that the United States also had an obligation under the 1819 Florida Treaty to
respect Spanish grants. E.g., Pollard’s Heirs, 39 U.S. at 388 (Baldwin, J.,
concurring). However, the majority held that the United States incurred no legal
obligations under the Florida Treaty concerning land west of the Perdido River
because the United States acquired that land from France in 1803. E.g.,
Pollard’s Lessee, 43 U.S. at 602.
184. See Pollard’s Heirs, 39 U.S. at 365 (“Such claims are certainly not
beyond the reach of Congress to confirm, although it may require a special act of
Congress for that purpose . . . .”). Congressional power was based on Article IV
of the Constitution, which grants Congress “[p]ower to dispose of . . . the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 3, cl. 2. If an individual held an inchoate title before the United States
acquired sovereignty, then the legal title passed to the United States under the
treaty, “with the equity attached in the claimant.” McDonogh v. Millaudon, 44
U.S. 693, 706 (1845). Property subject to an equitable claim was federal land
until the United States confirmed the claimant’s title. Sloss, supra note 156, at
151.
185. Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353, 358 (1840) (argument of Daniel
Webster, plaintiffs’ counsel). The number “thousand” refers to land grants in the
entire area of the territorial dispute with Spain, not just land in Mobile.
186. 43 U.S. 591 (1844).
187. 39 U.S. 353 (1840).
188. Id. at 362 (quoting An Act Enabling the Claimants to Lands Within the
Limits of the State of Missouri and Territory of Arkansas to Institute
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heirs of William Pollard.”189 In City of Mobile v. Emanuel190 and
City of Mobile v. Hallett,191 the Court affirmed the titles of
Spanish grantees, but did not cite any federal legislation
specifically confirming the validity of those titles. In City of
Mobile v. Eslava,192 the Court affirmed the validity of an
individual title “acquired by purchase from the United States, at
a public sale in 1820” pursuant to an 1818 federal statute.193
However, the Court changed course in its 1845 decision in
Pollard v. Hagan.194 To understand Hagan, an explanation of the
local geography is necessary.195 At that time, Water Street ran
north-south on the eastern edge of Mobile. The land west of
Water Street was dry. During the Spanish occupation, the land
east of Water Street was above water at low tide, but under water
at high tide. Despite the tidal flow, the Spanish government
issued several grants for land east of Water Street. That land
remained under water at high tide until 1822 or 1823, when
people constructed levees. All the Mobile waterfront cases
involved land east of Water Street that was under water at high
tide before 1822.
Congress admitted Alabama as a State in December 1819.196
In Hagan, the Court held that statehood gave Alabama
sovereignty over all the “navigable waters, and the soils under
them” within the state’s territorial limits.197 Statehood therefore
terminated Congress’s power under Article IV of the Constitution
to make “Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States,”198 insofar as Congress
purported to exercise that power over “the shores of navigable
waters” inside Alabama.199 Because the property at issue was
Proceedings to Try the Validity of Their Claims, 1824, ch. 173, § 1, 4 Stat. 36).
189. Id. at 366 (quoting Act of July 2, 1836, ch. 344, Stat. 222).
190. 42 U.S. 95 (1843).
191. 41 U.S. 261 (1842).
192. 41 U.S. 234 (1842).
193. Id. at 243.
194. 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
195. The following description is based on the cases cited in note 176, supra.
196. Goodtitle ex dem Pollard v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. 471, 474 (1850).
197. Hagan, 44 U.S. at 228–29.
198. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
199. Hagan, 44 U.S. at 230.
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waterfront property, “[t]he right of the United States to the public
lands, and the power of Congress to make all needful rules and
regulations for the sale and disposition thereof, conferred no
power to grant to the plaintiffs the land in controversy in this
case.”200 Hence, the federal statutes on which the Court based its
holdings in Files and Pollard’s Heirs were void because those
statutes, enacted in 1824 and 1836, purported to confirm or
convey title to land that was not subject to federal control after
1819.201 Similarly, the 1820 land sale that was the basis for the
individual’s title in Eslava was also presumably void.202
The Court reaffirmed Hagan’s central holding in Goodtitle ex
dem Pollard v. Kibbe.203 However, thirty years later the Court
partially overruled Hagan by holding that the United States can
exercise its power of eminent domain within the territorial
borders of a State.204 Interestingly, the Court relied partly on
international law to justify its view of the federal eminent domain
power.205
3. Comparison to Modern Public Law Cases
The Louisiana–Florida land cases are similar in several
respects to modern public law litigation. The land cases involved
judicial review of administrative decisions made pursuant to
federal statutes creating specialized tribunals (the land
commissions). The cases raised generic conflicts between private
parties and federal officials whose mission was to safeguard
public goods without adversely affecting private rights. Consider
an analogy to modern disability cases. In those cases, private
claimants assert an entitlement to public goods (federal
200. Id.
201. Pollard’s Lessee v. Files, 43 U.S. 591 (1844); Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39
U.S. 353 (1840).
202. By the same logic, numerous federal statutes concerning title to land in
Louisiana enacted after Louisiana became a state would also be void, but the
Court never pursued this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion.
203. 50 U.S. 471 (1850).
204. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
205. See id. at 371–72 (citing the works of Emmerich de Vattel and
Cornelius van Bynkershoek for the proposition that the power of eminent
domain “is inseparable from sovereignty”).
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dollars).206 Federal officers have a statutory duty to protect public
goods from unworthy claimants and to distribute those goods to
worthy claimants. Similarly, in the nineteenth century land
cases, private claimants asserted an entitlement to public goods
(federal lands). Federal officers had a statutory duty to protect
those public goods from unworthy claimants,207 but they also had
a duty (under treaties and customary international law) to
confirm the titles of worthy claimants. Thus, the nineteenth
century land cases are structurally similar to certain modern
administrative law cases.
One surprisingly modern feature of the nineteenth century
land cases was the prevalence of “cause lawyering.” In the midnineteenth century, the Court was ideologically divided between
Justices sympathetic to individuals who asserted property rights
based on French or Spanish grants, and Justices who favored the
federal government’s power to distribute land to its chosen
grantees.208 Joseph Mills White represented individual claimants
before the Supreme Court in at least twenty-four land cases.209
Daniel Webster argued several cases on behalf of private
claimants,210 joining White as co-counsel in two very significant
cases.211 White represented individual claimants because he was
committed to the “Jeffersonian belief . . . in small landholding as
206. See 42 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (2012) (“Every aged, blind, or disabled
individual who is determined under part A of this subchapter to be eligible on
the basis of his income and resources shall, in accordance with and subject to
the provisions of this subchapter, be paid benefits by the Commissioner of Social
Security.”).
207. See CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 152, at 123–24 (noting that
Attorney General John Crittenden, during his tenure as Attorney General,
succeeded in “saving nearly two million acres for the public domain”).
208. See SWISHER, supra note 142, at 748 (“[T]he Justices tended to fall into
two groups. One group put emphasis on the sanctity of alleged grants, and the
other on the right of settlers to acquire possession by entering upon unoccupied
lands under the preemption laws of the Federal Government.”).
209. DIBBLE, supra note 174, at 173–81.
210. See MAURICE G. BAXTER, DANIEL WEBSTER & THE SUPREME COURT 143–
45 (1966) (discussing Daniel Webster’s involvement in Florida land cases).
211. White and Webster served as co-counsel in Arredondo, see supra Part
IV.B.1 (discussing the important role of Arredondo in the Louisiana–Florida
land cases), as well as Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711 (1835). Mitchel was
significant because the Court granted about 1.2 million acres of land to private
claimants, the largest single victory (in terms of acreage) for private claimants
in any of the Louisiana–Florida land cases. Id. at 725, 762.
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the secret to the creation and maintenance of a viable
democracy.”212 Similarly, Webster represented individual
claimants because he believed, based on “[f]irst principles of
justice drawn from natural law,” that “government must
recognize claims of title to ownership . . . and must assure a large
measure of freedom in the uses of property.”213
Modern lawyers might frame property rights claims against
the government as Fifth Amendment Takings claims. However,
the lawyers who litigated the Louisiana–Florida property cases
rarely invoked constitutional law to frame their arguments,214
and the Court rarely applied constitutional law to decide the
cases. In the pre-Civil War era, a constitutional claim challenging
a governmental taking of private property would probably have
failed because key legal precedents supported the government’s
power to seize private property without paying compensation.215
Regardless, claimants did not need constitutional law to protect
their rights from government infringement because the courts
protected their rights through vigorous enforcement of
international law.
C. Chinese Habeas Litigation
Between 1882 and 1905, Chinese petitioners seeking
admission into the United States filed thousands of habeas
corpus petitions in federal courts.216 Despite restrictive
212. DIBBLE, supra note 174, at 159.
213. BAXTER, supra note 210, at 142.
214. From the perspective of individual claimants who held inchoate titles
based on French or Spanish grants, government efforts to seize their land
probably seemed like a taking of private property for public use. From the
government’s standpoint, there was no taking because the government actually
held legal title to the property after the transfer of sovereignty from France or
Spain. Supra note 184. However, that view was contestable. Lawyers could
reasonably have presented the claims as Fifth Amendment Takings claims.
215. See generally DANIEL W. HAMILTON, THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY:
PROPERTY CONFISCATION IN THE UNION AND THE CONFEDERACY DURING THE CIVIL
WAR 1–4 (2007).
216. This section focuses solely on “exclusion” cases, where the government
sought to prevent Chinese persons from entering the United States. It does not
address “deportation” cases, where the government sought to remove someone
who had entered previously.
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immigration laws designed to exclude Chinese immigrants,
petitioners won a very high proportion of those cases.217 Judicial
decisions relied primarily on international law, not constitutional
law, to support the entry rights of Chinese petitioners. The
Supreme Court did not invalidate any federal laws restricting
Chinese immigration during this period.218 Thus, the analysis
shows that courts can provide robust protection for individual
rights in a manner consistent with principles of popular
sovereignty by applying international law to constrain
government power and protect individual rights. The following
narrative is divided into three time periods: 1868–1888, 1888–
1894, and 1894–1905.
1. Period One: 1868–1888
China and the United States concluded the Burlingame
Treaty in 1868.219 Evoking natural law, the treaty affirmed the
“inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home.”220
Both countries promised to allow “free migration and emigration
of their citizens and subjects, respectively, from the one country
to the other, for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent
residents.”221 By 1880, more than 100,000 Chinese nationals were
living in the United States.222 The influx of immigrants produced
a political backlash, resulting in a wave of anti-Chinese
legislation. Responding to political pressure to restrict Chinese
immigration, President Hayes appointed a commission to
renegotiate the treaty with China.223
217. See generally LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE
IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995).
218. The Court did invalidate some state laws that discriminated against
Chinese residents. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886)
(concluding that an ordinance that was applied in a discriminatory manner was
“a denial of the equal protection of the laws, and a violation of the fourteenth
amendment of the constitution”). And in Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228 (1896), the Court invalidated a federal statute subjecting Chinese persons to
criminal penalties without granting them Fifth or Sixth Amendment jury rights.
219. Burlingame Treaty, U.S.–China, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739.
220. Id. at art. V.
221. Id.
222. SALYER, supra note 217, at 7–8.
223. Id. at 12–14.
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The new treaty, concluded in 1880, allowed the United States
to restrict, but not prohibit, immigration of Chinese laborers
“[w]henever in the opinion of the Government of the United
States, the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States, or
their residence therein, affects or threatens to affect the interests
of that country, or to endanger the good order of the said
country.”224 Although the treaty permitted restrictions on
immigration of Chinese laborers, “[t]he limitation . . . shall apply
only to Chinese who may go to the United States as laborers,
other classes not being included in the limitations.”225 The treaty
provided that “teachers, students, [and] merchants,” as well as
laborers who resided in the United States before entry into force
of the treaty, “shall be allowed to go and come of their own free
will and accord.”226 Thus, the new treaty attempted to balance the
populist desire to exclude Chinese immigrants with the natural
law commitment to the “inherent and inalienable right of man to
change his home.”227
After conclusion of the 1880 treaty, Congress enacted the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, suspending immigration of
Chinese laborers for ten years, as permitted by the treaty.228 The
Act gave primary enforcement responsibility to customs collectors
at ports of entry.229 The collector in San Francisco “adopted a very
strict reading of the act” and denied entry to numerous
prospective immigrants.230 The Chinese responded by filing
habeas petitions in the Northern District of California. The
federal court adopted a more expansive view of Chinese entry
rights than the customs collector. Consequently, “[w]ithin
fourteen months of the act’s passage . . . the federal courts were
directly or indirectly responsible for the entry of one-third of all
Chinese landed during that period.”231 Judicial decisions granting
224. Treaty Concerning Immigration, U.S.–China, art. I, Nov. 17, 1880, 22
Stat. 826.
225. Id.
226. Id. at art. II.
227. Burlingame Treaty, supra note 219, art. V.
228. Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58.
229. Id. § 9.
230. SALYER, supra note 217, at 18.
231. Id. at 19 (citing Hudson N. Janisch, The Chinese, the Courts, and the
Constitution: A Study of the Legal Issues Raised by Chinese Immigration to the
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habeas petitions invoked treaties with China as the primary
source of rights for Chinese immigrants.232
In 1884, Congress amended the Chinese Exclusion Act to
create additional hurdles for prospective immigrants.233 Under
the 1880 treaty and the 1882 statute, Chinese laborers who lived
in the United States before passage of the 1882 Act retained the
right to exit and return. Not surprisingly, customs collectors had
difficulty distinguishing between Chinese who actually resided in
the United States before 1882, and those who falsely claimed
prior residence to gain entry.234 The 1882 Act addressed this
problem by allowing Chinese laborers to obtain a certificate
before leaving the country.235 The certificate entitled Chinese
laborers to “re-enter the United States upon producing and
delivering the same to the collector of customs.”236 The 1884
Amendment tightened the rules by providing that “said
certificate shall be the only evidence permissible to establish his
right of re-entry.”237
Despite the clear statutory mandate, the Supreme Court
soon decided two cases holding that “said certificate” was not the
only evidence permissible to establish a right of entry. In Chew
Heong v. United States,238 the Court held that a Chinese laborer
who resided in the United States before passage of the 1882 Act,
left the country without a certificate before enactment of the 1884
United States 1850–1902 (1971) (unpublished J.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago)).
232. See, e.g., In re Chin A On, 18 F. 506, 507 (D.C. Cal. 1883) (“[B]efore we
can impute to congress an intention to violate an important article of a treaty
with a foreign power, that intention must be clearly and unequivocally
manifested, and the language of the law, which is supposed to constitute the
violation, must admit of no other reasonable construction.”); Case of the Chinese
Merchant, 13 F. 605, 608 (C.C. Cal. 1882) (“[W]e will not assume, in the absence
of plain language to the contrary, that congress intended to disregard the
obligations of the original treaty of 1868, which remains in full force except as
modified by the supplementary treaty of 1880.”).
233. Act of July 5, 1884, 23 Stat. 115.
234. See SALYER, supra note 217, at 76 (noting that most of the officials
responsible for enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Act “shared the belief . . . that
the Chinese and their witnesses lied to gain entry”).
235. Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58, § 4.
236. Id.
237. Act of July 5, 1884, 23 Stat. 115, § 4 (emphasis added).
238. 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
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Amendment, and then sought re-entry after passage of the 1884
Amendment, was entitled to enter the country without a
certificate.239 The Court stated: “[Because] the purpose avowed in
the act was to faithfully execute the treaty, any interpretation of
its provisions would be rejected which imputes to congress an
intention to disregard the plighted faith of the government, and,
consequently, the court ought, if possible, to adopt that
construction which recognized and saved rights secured by the
treaty.”240 Similarly, in United States v. Jung Ah Lung,241 the
Court held that a Chinese laborer who claimed that his certificate
was stolen was entitled to re-enter if he could prove prior
residence by other means.242
Between passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 and
passage of the Scott Act in 1888, federal courts consistently
adopted a more generous view of Chinese entry rights than the
customs collector in San Francisco.243 By 1888, “4,091 Chinese
had petitioned the federal courts for a hearing.”244 The courts
granted petitioners entry rights in 85% of Chinese habeas
cases.245 Although the Chinese Exclusion Act was clearly
intended to restrict immigration, the courts construed the Act
broadly to protect the treaty-based entry rights of Chinese
immigrants. Courts justified their decisions by invoking the
principle that statutes should be construed in conformity with
U.S. treaty obligations.246 In sum, the courts provided robust
protection for Chinese entry rights without applying
constitutional law and without invalidating any federal
legislation governing Chinese immigration.

239. Id. at 541–60.
240. Id. at 549.
241. 124 U.S. 621 (1888).
242. Id. at 633–35.
243. See SALYER, supra note 217, at 18–19 (discussing the antagonistic
relationship that developed between the federal courts and the local collectors).
244. Id. at 20.
245. Id.
246. See supra notes 233, 239, and accompanying text; In re Tung Yeong, 19
F. 184, 185–86 (D.C. Cal. 1884) (“[I]t was considered that no construction should
be given to the law which would violate the provisions of the treaty, if such
construction could be avoided.”).
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2. Period Two: 1888–1894
Congress enacted the Scott Act in 1888.247 The 1882 and 1884
Acts could plausibly be construed consistently with the 1880
treaty. In the Scott Act, though, Congress made unmistakably
clear that it did not intend to comply with the treaty. Although
the treaty guaranteed Chinese laborers who resided in the United
States before 1880 the right to “go and come of their own free
will,”248 the Scott Act provided that “it shall be unlawful for any
Chinese laborer who shall at any time heretofore have been . . . a
resident within the United States, and who shall have departed,
or shall depart, therefrom, and shall not have returned before the
passage of this act, to return to . . . the United States.”249 To avert
any possible misinterpretation, Congress added that “every
certificate heretofore issued . . . is hereby declared void . . . and
the Chinese laborer claiming admission by virtue thereof shall
not be permitted to enter the United States.”250
In Chae Chan Ping v. United States,251 a Chinese laborer who
held a certificate under the 1884 Act tried to reenter the United
States.252 The customs collector denied him entry in reliance on
the Scott Act because the Act declared the certificate void.253
Chae Chan Ping challenged the constitutionality of the Act,
arguing that it constituted an illegal “expulsion from the country
of Chinese laborers, in violation of existing treaties between the
United States and the government of China, and of rights vested
in them under the laws of Congress.”254 The Supreme Court
upheld the Act. The Court acknowledged that the Act
contravened “express stipulations of the treaty of 1868, and of the
supplemental treaty of 1880.”255 Nevertheless, the Court ruled

247. Scott Act, Oct. 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 504.
248. Treaty Concerning Immigration, U.S.–China, art. II, Nov. 17, 1880, 22
Stat. 826.
249. Scott Act, Oct. 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 504, § 1.
250. Id. § 2.
251. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
252. Id. at 582.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 589.
255. Id. at 600.
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that “the last expression of the sovereign will must control.”256
The Court’s opinion is replete with language affirming the
principle that courts must give judicial effect to statutes enacted
by democratic legislatures.
After Chae Chan Ping, Chinese nationals could no longer
enter the country as laborers. Nevertheless, Chinese immigrants
continued to litigate habeas petitions with great success by
claiming a right to enter the country as merchants,257 U.S.
citizens,258 or the wives or children of merchants or citizens.259 In
December 1890, a customs inspector testified that, between
passage of the Scott Act and November 30, 1890, the federal court
in San Francisco granted almost two thousand habeas petitions
filed by Chinese immigrants, but denied only 157 petitions.260
Thus, Chinese petitioners won almost 93% of the habeas petitions
filed within the first twenty-six months after passage of the Scott
Act. Overall, between 1882 and 1891, “the Chinese filed more
than seven thousand petitions for habeas corpus, and the court
attracted the wrath of the public and the administrative officials
by allowing the vast majority of these Chinese to enter freely.”261
Congress enacted a new immigration law in 1891.262 The
1891 Act barred judicial review of administrative decisions
denying entry to noncitizens.263 However, the prohibition of
judicial review did not apply to Chinese immigrants.264
Consequently, federal courts continued to grant Chinese habeas
petitions. Professor Salyer determined that the federal district
court in San Francisco granted Chinese habeas petitions at an
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 62 (1892) (granting
entry to Chinese merchant).
258. See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693–94 (1898)
(granting entry to a person of Chinese descent who was a U.S. citizen).
259. See, e.g., United States v. Gue Lim, 176 U.S. 459, 408–09 (1900) (ruling
in favor of the wife of a Chinese merchant).
260. Chinese Immigration: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on
Immigration & Naturalization, 51st Cong. 272–73 (1890) (statement of S. J.
Ruddell, customs inspector in San Francisco).
261. SALYER, supra note 217, at 33.
262. Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084.
263. See generally Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
264. See SALYER, supra note 217, at 26–32 (discussing the intended effects of
the Act and its treatment by courts).
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annual rate of 73% in 1891, 88% in 1892, 66% in 1893, and 80%
in 1894.265
Lau Ow Bew v. United States266 illustrates the types of cases
litigated in the early 1890s. Petitioner had lived in the United
States for seventeen years. During that time he was “engaged in
the wholesale and importing mercantile business in the city of
Portland,” Oregon.267 He departed the country in September 1890
to visit relatives in China, returning in August 1891. When he
returned, he produced documents to show that he was a
merchant. As a merchant, the treaties protected his right to enter
the country. The customs collector denied re-entry,268 invoking a
statute requiring Chinese merchants to “obtain the permission
of . . . the Chinese Government . . . in each case to be evidenced
by a certificate issued by such Government.”269
Chief Justice Fuller asked: “Does the section apply to
Chinese merchants, already domiciled in the United States, who,
having left the country for temporary purposes . . . seek to reenter it on their return to their business and their homes?”270 The
Court concluded that it was absurd to require a merchant who
had lived in the United States for seventeen years to obtain a
certificate from the Chinese government granting him permission
to return to the country.271 Chief Justice Fuller applied standard
principles of statutory interpretation to support this conclusion.
He also invoked petitioner’s rights under “general international
law” and the United States’ treaties with China.272 Finally, he
quoted the Court’s prior decision in Chew Heong: “[S]ince the
purpose avowed in the [Chinese Exclusion] act was to faithfully
execute the treaty, any interpretation of its provisions would be
rejected which imputed to congress an intention to disregard the
plighted faith of the government; and, consequently, the court

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. These figures apply only to exclusion cases, not deportation cases.
144 U.S. 47 (1892).
Id. at 48.
Id. at 48–49.
Act of July 5, 1884, § 6, 23 Stat. 115, 116.
Lau Ow Bew, 144 U.S. at 59.
Id. at 59–61.
Id. at 61–62.
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ought, if possible, to adopt that construction which recognized
and saved rights secured by the treaty.”273
In sum, federal courts applied a combination of statutes and
treaties to provide judicial protection for the treaty-based rights
of Chinese immigrants.274 By applying statutes and treaties,
rather than constitutional law,275 the courts preserved Congress’s
prerogative to modify the governing legal rules. Thus, Chinese
habeas litigation provides an example of polymorphous public law
litigation that combines robust judicial protection for individual
rights with genuine judicial respect for popular sovereignty.
3. Period Three: 1894–1905
In 1894, the United States and China concluded a new treaty
prohibiting entry of Chinese laborers into the United States “for a
period of ten years.”276 The treaty reaffirmed that “[t]he
provisions of this Convention shall not affect the right . . . of
Chinese subjects, being officials, teachers, students, merchants or
travellers for curiosity or pleasure, but not laborers, of coming to
the United States and residing therein.”277 Thus, as before, the
1894 treaty balanced the populist desire to exclude Chinese
laborers with the natural law commitment to the “inherent and
inalienable right of man to change his home.”278
Meanwhile, the public was concerned that Chinese
petitioners were repeatedly using habeas corpus to overturn
administrative decisions denying them admission.279 Accordingly,
273. Id. at 62 (quoting Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 549).
274. Non-Chinese immigrants did not fare as well because the 1891 Act
barred judicial review of administrative decisions in those cases. Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
275. During this period, the Court frequently invoked international law in
the context of constitutional interpretation to support an expansive view of
government power that limited protection for individual rights. In contrast, the
Court used international law in statutory interpretation to constrain
government power and protect individual rights. Lee & Sloss, supra note 21.
276. Convention on Immigration, U.S.–China, art. I, March 17, 1894, 28
Stat. 1210.
277. Id. art. III.
278. Burlingame Treaty, supra note 219, art. V.
279. SALYER, supra note 217, at 96–97.
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in August 1894 Congress enacted an amendment barring judicial
review of exclusion decisions. The statute provided: “In every case
where an alien is excluded from admission into the United
States . . . the decision of the appropriate immigration or customs
officers, if adverse to the admission of such alien, shall be final,
unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury.”280
Thus, the statute extended to Chinese immigrants the bar on
judicial review that previously applied to other noncitizens under
the 1891 Act.
In Lem Moon Sing v. United States,281 a Chinese merchant
with a “permanent domicile” in the United States filed a petition
challenging a customs officer’s decision denying him admission
when he returned home after a temporary business trip to
China.282 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision
denying habeas relief, concluding that the 1894 Act precluded
judicial review of the customs officer’s decision.283 The Court
relied on its prior decision in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,
which upheld the validity of the 1891 statute barring judicial
review of administrative decisions in non-Chinese cases.284
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority in Lem Moon Sing, said
there was no principled basis for distinguishing between the 1891
statute at issue in Nishimura Ekiu and the 1894 statute at issue
in Lem Moon Sing.285
Respectfully, the Court’s decision in Lem Moon Sing was
mistaken. Lem Moon Sing and Nishimura Ekiu are readily
distinguishable. In Nishimura Ekiu, the petitioner was “a person
without means of support, without relatives or friends in the
United States . . . unable to care for herself, and liable to become
a public charge.”286 She was therefore ineligible to enter under
the 1891 statute. In contrast, Lem Moon Sing was a Chinese
merchant with a permanent domicile in the United States who—
based on the facts in the Supreme Court’s opinion—had a clear
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Act of August 18, 1894, 28 Stat. 390.
158 U.S. 538 (1895).
Id. at 539–40.
Id. at 540.
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 541–47.
Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 656.
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right to enter under the 1894 treaty. The Court’s opinion in Lem
Moon Sing provides no indication of any statutory basis for the
customs officer’s decision to deny entry; his decision may have
been entirely arbitrary and capricious. Even so, said Justice
Harlan, the 1894 statute barred judicial review by way of habeas
corpus.287 That conclusion is troubling. The Court could easily
have held that Congress did not intend to bar judicial review in
cases where the immigration inspector’s decision was arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to clearly established law.288
Lem Moon Sing appeared finally to bar judicial review of
habeas petitions in Chinese exclusion cases. However, the courts
continued to entertain habeas petitions from people of Chinese
descent who claimed to be U.S. citizens. In United States v. Wong
Kim Ark,289 the Court held that “a child born in the United
States, of parents of Chinese descent, who at the time of his
birth . . . have a permanent domicile and residence in the United
States . . . becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United
States, by virtue of” the Fourteenth Amendment.290 Because the
1894 statute merely barred judicial review in cases “where an
alien is excluded from admission,”291 persons of Chinese descent
who claimed birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth
Amendment could still obtain judicial review.
Surprisingly, federal courts continued to grant habeas relief
in most cases. Between 1895 (when Lem Moon Sing was decided)
and 1904, the Northern District of California entertained 1,559
habeas petitions filed by persons of Chinese descent who sought
admission to the country. The court granted relief in about 55% of
those cases.292 Chinese habeas litigation finally ended in 1905
when the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Ju Toy that
287. Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 541–47.
288. The Court’s opinion in Lem Moon Sing presents the issues as if there is
a stark choice between de novo review or zero review, with no possible middle
ground. Id. at 546–47. In this respect, the Court’s opinion is at odds with
modern administrative law, which recognizes various circumstances where
deferential judicial review is appropriate.
289. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
290. Id. at 653. The Fourteenth Amendment specifies: “All persons born . . .
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
291. Act of August 18, 1894, 28 Stat. 390 (emphasis added).
292. SALYER, supra note 217, at 80 Table 3.
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federal courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions
filed by persons of Chinese descent who claimed birthright
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.293
One can legitimately criticize the decisions in Lem Moon
Sing and Ju Toy on the grounds that the Court caved too quickly
to legislative efforts to bar judicial review of administrative
decisions. The Court could potentially have done more to preserve
limited judicial review without invalidating statutes approved by
Congress. Still, the overall record of federal court decisions
between 1882 and 1905 reveals a federal judiciary that was
committed to both individual rights and popular sovereignty, and
that did a creditable job mitigating the tension between those
competing goals.
D. Summary
The preceding case studies illustrate several points about
nineteenth century public law litigation. In both the Chinese
cases and the Louisiana–Florida cases, federal courts relied on
international law, not constitutional law, to protect individual
rights from government infringement. The empirical analysis
above shows that judicial reliance on international law was a
characteristic feature of nineteenth century public law litigation.
The rights at issue in both the Chinese cases and the
Louisiana–Florida cases could reasonably be characterized as
“fundamental” rights. The Burlingame Treaty affirmed the
“inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home.”294
John Marshall stated, “that sense of justice and of right which is
acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be
outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated, and
private rights annulled” when territory is transferred between
sovereigns.295 Although many nineteenth century lawyers
conceived the rights at issue as “fundamental,” they did not
constitutionalize those rights. The Court could have invoked the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to protect property rights in
293. 198 U.S. 253 (1905). The Court left an opening for petitioners who
alleged abuse of authority by administrative officers.
294. Burlingame Treaty, supra note 219, art. V.
295. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 87 (1833).
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Louisiana and Florida.296 It could reasonably have invoked the
liberty component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to
protect the “inalienable right of man to change his home.”297
Instead, the courts relied on international law, not constitutional
law, to protect fundamental rights.
The choice to rely on international law, rather than
constitutional law, did not undermine judicial protection for
individual rights. The property owners in the Louisiana–Florida
cases and the Chinese immigrants in the habeas cases had
remarkably successful litigation records.298 Indeed, it would be
difficult to identify any area of modern constitutional litigation
where groups have achieved a higher winning percentage
litigating claims against the federal government.
Finally, nineteenth century public law litigation was broadly
consistent with principles of popular sovereignty. Although the
Supreme Court frequently ruled against the federal government
in the Louisiana–Florida cases and the Chinese cases, the Court
rarely invalidated a federal statute.299 Moreover, the Court
typically framed its decisions in ways that avoided placing
significant restrictions on Congress’s future legislative options. In
contrast, the modern Supreme Court often issues constitutional
decisions invalidating federal statutes300 and frames its decisions
in ways that impose significant restrictions on Congress’s future
legislative options.301 Hence, the shift from a polymorphous model

296. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
297. Indeed, the right to freedom of movement is arguably a stronger
candidate for substantive protection under the Due Process Clause than the
right not to be sued in an out-of-state court, which the Supreme Court
constitutionalized after Pennoyer. See supra notes 7–21 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 166–71, 245–46, 260–65, 289–91 and accompanying
text.
299. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing the Chinese
cases); supra notes 176–78, 194–205 and accompanying text (discussing the
Louisiana–Florida cases).
300. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(invalidating portions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating portions of the Violence
Against Women Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating
portions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
301. See, e.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (restricting the scope of Congress’s
legislative power under the Spending Clause); Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (restricting
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of public law litigation in the nineteenth century to a
constitutionalized model in the twentieth century exacerbated the
tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty.
V. Reviving the Polymorphous Model of Public Law Litigation
Given that nineteenth century federal courts applied a
polymorphous model of public law litigation, is it feasible or
desirable to revive that model in the twenty-first century? The
primary argument in favor of revival can be summarized as
follows. Judicial review is essential to protect individual rights.
Popular sovereignty is essential to preserve “government of the
people, by the people, [and] for the people.”302 Our current
constitutionalized system of public law litigation sets up a stark
choice: either we sacrifice individual rights for popular
sovereignty, or we sacrifice democratic self-government for the
sake of individual rights. Because neither option is attractive, it
makes sense to identify a middle way. The polymorphous model
provides a middle way. By reviving that model, we can mitigate
the tension between individual rights and popular sovereignty.
Part V of this Article addresses application of the
polymorphous model in the modern world. The analysis is divided
into three sections. The first subpart shows that international
human rights treaties could function as a partial substitute for
modern constitutional law. The next section discusses three
examples to illustrate the practical application of the
polymorphous model. The final section addresses several
objections to the project of a twenty-first century revival of the
polymorphous model.

the scope of Congress’s legislative power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Unites States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (restricting the scope
of Congress’s legislative power under the Commerce Clause).
302. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19,
1863), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859–1865, at 536 (Don
E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
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A. International Human Rights Treaties as a Partial Substitute
for Constitutional Law
Nineteenth century federal courts applied a combination of
treaties, customary international law, common law, statutes, and
constitutional law to protect individual rights from government
infringement. During the twentieth century, treaties, customary
international law, and common law largely disappeared from the
menu of options, leaving statutes and constitutional law as the
primary tools for courts to apply as constraints on government
action. In theory, advocates of a polymorphous model could
attempt to revive older traditions involving judicial application of
common law or customary international law. However, both types
of law present difficulties. Revival of a nineteenth century
common law tradition would require the Supreme Court to
overrule or reinterpret its decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins.303 Even if the Court was willing to do so, common law
provides a poor substitute for modern constitutional law because
there is limited overlap between the rights protected by
constitutional law and the rights protected by common law.304
Customary international law (CIL) may appear to be a better
fit because CIL incorporates some modern international human
rights law,305 and there is substantial overlap between human
rights law and constitutional law. However, the extent to which
CIL incorporates international human rights law is sharply
contested.306 Moreover, the process for incorporating CIL into
domestic law is generally less democratic than the process for
incorporating treaties.307 Because the main purpose of reviving
303. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
304. But see Wise v. Withers, 3 U.S. 331, 332, 336 (1806) (bringing a
trespass action against a federal officer who searched his home without a
warrant). Modern courts would frame the case as a Fourth Amendment
violation because it involved the warrantless search of a home, but Chief Justice
Marshall analyzed it as a trespass case. See id. at 336 (finding the officers to be
trespassers).
305. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987)
(listing state actions that violate international law, including genocide, slavery,
murder, torture, and discrimination).
306. See generally J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International
Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 466–67 (2000).
307. See supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text.

POLYMORPHOUS PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION

1829

the polymorphous model is to mitigate tension between judicial
review and popular sovereignty, it makes sense to focus on law
that has been incorporated into domestic law through a
democratic process. Therefore, Part V focuses on international
human rights treaties as a partial substitute for constitutional
law.308 It bears emphasis, though, that this Article’s focus on
human rights treaties is not intended to disparage judicial
reliance on common law, CIL, or non-human-rights treaties as
part of a broader effort to revive a polymorphous model.309
The rights protected by human rights treaties are broadly
similar to the rights protected by federal constitutional law. The
First Amendment protects freedom of religion;310 so does Article
18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).311 The Fourth Amendment restricts government
interference with “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”312
Similarly, Article 17 of the ICCPR restricts government
interference with “privacy, family, home or correspondence.”313
The Fifth Amendment prohibits compelled confessions,314 as does
Article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR. The Sixth Amendment guarantees
a right to counsel,315 as do Articles 14(3)(b) and (d) of the ICCPR.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual
308. One could argue that human rights treaties ratified by the United
States have not been incorporated into U.S. law because we ratified the treaties
subject to non-self-executing declarations. That argument has some merit.
However, the better view is that human rights treaties ratified by the United
States are part of the corpus of federal law, notwithstanding the non-selfexecuting declarations. David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human
Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J.
INT’L L. 129, 144–71 (1999).
309. Human rights law is not the only body of international law with rights
protection similar to federal constitutional law. For example, international rules
on expropriation provide protection for private property similar to the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause. Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth
Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an
International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (2003).
310. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
311. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
312. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
313. ICCPR, supra note 311, art. 17.
314. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
315. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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punishments.”316 Similarly, Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 16
of the Torture Convention prohibit “cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”317 The Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of race or
gender,318 as do Article 26 of the ICCPR, Article 2 of CERD (for
racial discrimination),319 and Article 2 of CEDAW (for gender
discrimination).320
Despite the substantive overlap, international human rights
law does not provide a complete substitute for federal
constitutional law. Much of the Supreme Court’s constitutional
doctrine involves federalism and separation of powers issues.
International law has little to say about the appropriate
distribution of power between federal and state governments or
among the branches of the federal government.321 Therefore,
under a polymorphous model, federalism and separation of
powers issues would presumably be litigated as constitutional
claims, not international claims.
Similarly, some individual rights claims would continue to be
litigated as constitutional claims because federal constitutional
law provides stronger protection for certain rights than does
international law. For example, the Court has held that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep a gun in
one’s home for self-defense.322 There is no international law
316. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
317. See ICCPR, supra note 311, art. 7; Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Feb. 4, 1985,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
318. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 663–738 (2d ed. 2002).
319. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
320. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. The United
States is not a party to CEDAW. However, the United States is a party to the
ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the CERD.
321. Individual Justices have cited foreign law, not international law, to
shed light on constitutional federalism issues. See, e.g., Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 976–77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Whereas a comparative
constitutional analysis may be helpful in examining certain federalism issues, I
am not aware of any international legal rules that are especially helpful in this
regard.
322. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); District of
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analogue to the Second Amendment right to bear arms.
Additionally, the Court has construed the First Amendment Free
Speech Clause to limit the power of state and federal
governments to regulate campaign finance.323 International
human rights law does protect freedom of expression,324 but
judicial review of campaign finance laws under an international
human rights standard would likely be more deferential than the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.325
In sum, international human rights law could provide a
partial substitute, but not a complete substitute, for federal
constitutional law. If Congress authorized federal courts to apply
international human rights treaties, or if judges did so without
express congressional authorization, the courts could protect
many rights currently protected under federal constitutional law
by applying international human rights law as a constraint on
government power. Because Congress has power to regulate the
domestic application of treaties, shifting from a constitutional law
discourse to an international human rights discourse would
mitigate the tension between judicial review and popular
sovereignty by facilitating greater legislative participation in
creating rules for the domestic protection of human rights. The
next section discusses three examples to illustrate this point.
B. Three Illustrative Examples
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld326 is a rare case where the Court
applied the polymorphous model in the twenty-first century.
Hamdan involved the trial by military commission of an
individual detained at Guantanamo Bay. Defendant challenged
the jurisdiction of the military commission, raising a combination
of constitutional, common law, statutory, and international law

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
323. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
324. See ICCPR, supra note 311, art. 19.
325. See generally Wayne Batchis, Reconciling Campaign Finance Reform
with the First Amendment: Looking Both Inside and Outside America’s Borders,
25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 62–72 (2006).
326. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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arguments.327 The Court could potentially have ruled that the
commission procedures violated Hamdan’s constitutional
rights.328 Instead, the Court held that the military commission
violated rights protected by the Geneva Conventions and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).329 By resolving the
case on statutory and treaty grounds,330 the Court invited further
democratic lawmaking by the political branches.331 Hence, the
Court mitigated the tension between judicial review and popular
sovereignty by ruling against the government without
constraining future legislative options.332
Judicial supremacists may object that the Court abdicated its
responsibility to protect individual rights because Congress
subsequently enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006,333
which infringed the due process rights of defendants tried by
military commission.334 However, that legislation was short-lived.
After the 2008 presidential election, President Obama worked
with a Democratic Congress to produce the 2009 Military
Commissions Act.335 Although the 2009 Act does not provide the
327. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 156 (D.D.C. 2004)
(summarizing eight counts raised in petition).
328. See id. (noting that Hamdan alleged that the commission procedures
violated the Fifth Amendment).
329. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 613–35. The Court did not apply the Geneva
Conventions directly, but instead reasoned that the government must comply
with the Geneva Conventions because Congress had incorporated the
Convention’s key substantive provisions into the UCMJ by its statutory
reference to the “law of war.” Id. at 627–28.
330. Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, also invoked the “common law
of war” in support of his view that the conspiracy charge against Hamdan
should be dismissed. Id. at 595–613.
331. See id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nothing prevents the President
from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary . . . .
[J]udicial insistence upon that consultation [with Congress] . . . strengthens the
Nation’s ability to determine—through democratic means—how best to address
the issues.”).
332. Jack Balkin, Hamdan as a Democracy-Forcing Decision, BALKINIZATION
(June 29, 2006), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/06/hamdan-as-democracyforcing-decision.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
333. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
334. See, e.g., David Kinley, Human Rights Fundamentalisms, 29 SYDNEY L.
REV. 545, 556 (2007) (asserting that the 2006 statute provides a “grotesque
example of rights and liberties breached in the name of counter-terrorism”).
335. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, Div. A, Tit.
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full range of procedural rights applicable to criminal defendants
in federal court, the 2009 Act “addressed a number of key
objections to the statutory framework Congress and the Bush
Administration had crafted in 2006.”336 Thus, the story of
Hamdan and the Military Commissions Act demonstrates that
judicial supremacy is not always necessary to protect individual
rights. In some cases, the Court can give Congress the last word
without sacrificing fundamental rights.
In Miller v. Alabama,337 a state court sentenced a defendant
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for
a crime he committed at age fourteen. The Alabama statute did
not grant the trial judge any discretion to impose a lesser
sentence. According to the Supreme Court, that lack of discretion
was critical: for juvenile offenders, the Eighth Amendment
requires states to accord discretion to trial courts to consider
youth as a mitigating factor and to impose a more lenient
sentence in appropriate circumstances.338 The Supreme Court
reversed the sentence, thereby vindicating the defendant’s
fundamental rights. However, by relying on the Eighth
Amendment the Court constrained future legislative options.
Thus, Miller illustrates the classic judicial supremacist dilemma.
In a system that combines constitutional judicial review with
judicial supremacy, either individual rights trump popular
sovereignty or popular sovereignty trumps individual rights.
There does not appear to be a middle way.
Assume, hypothetically, that the defendant in Miller
challenged the Alabama statute as a violation of his rights under
the ICCPR. Article 24(1) specifies that “[e]very child shall
have . . . the right to such measures of protection as are required
by his status as a minor.”339 The Human Rights Committee, a
treaty implementing body created by the ICCPR, has said,
“[S]entencing children to [a] life sentence without parole is of

XVIII, 123 Stat. 2574.
336. Robert M. Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The
Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 163, 176
(2013).
337. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
338. Id. at 2463–69.
339. ICCPR, supra note 311, art. 24(1).
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itself not in compliance with [A]rticle 24(1).”340 Thus, just as the
Supreme Court construed the Eighth Amendment to require state
courts to take account of the child’s age in sentencing decisions, it
could reasonably have construed Article 24 in precisely the same
way. Because Article 24 is the “supreme Law of the Land” under
the Supremacy Clause, the Court could have reversed the
conviction by holding that Article 24 superseded Alabama law.341
A treaty supremacy holding would be similar to the Court’s
Eighth Amendment holding because it would vindicate the
defendant’s rights and constrain future legislative options at the
state level. However, by relying on the treaty instead of the
Eighth Amendment, the Court would preserve Congress’s
prerogative to enact legislation authorizing state action
inconsistent with the treaty (or inconsistent with the Court’s
interpretation of the treaty).342 Therefore, in contrast to
constitutional law discourse, international human rights
discourse helps mitigate the tension between judicial review and
popular sovereignty.
Next, consider Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District.343 In that case, parents of public school
students raised equal protection challenges to affirmative action
plans adopted by local school districts in Seattle, Washington and
Louisville, Kentucky. The Court held that both plans violated the
Equal Protection Clause because they relied “upon an individual
340. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee: United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1
(Dec. 18, 2006).
341. The main counterargument is that Article 24 is not judicially
enforceable because the United States ratified the ICCPR subject to a
declaration that the treaty is “not self-executing.” The proper interpretation of
that declaration is contested. I have argued elsewhere that the declaration
should be interpreted to limit the opportunities for plaintiffs to raise treaty
claims offensively, but criminal defendants in state courts—like the defendant
in Miller—can invoke the treaty defensively. Sloss, supra note 308. Interpreting
the declaration to preclude criminal defendants in state courts from raising a
treaty preemption defense would raise serious constitutional problems. See
generally David Sloss, The Constitutional Right to a Treaty Preemption Defense,
40 U. TOL. L. REV. 971 (2009).
342. Congress has the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to
enact legislation implementing U.S. treaty obligations. Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416 (1920).
343. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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student’s race in assigning that student to a particular school.”344
The Court’s holding is consistent with prior decisions applying
strict scrutiny to racial classifications intended to benefit
disadvantaged groups.345 However, that holding is in tension with
principles of popular sovereignty and federalism because the
Court invalidated policies adopted by local decision-makers who
were elected by their local communities to address issues of local
concern.346 Whether the Court’s interference with local,
democratic decision-making was necessary to vindicate
constitutional rights is debatable.347
In contrast to Miller, the Court in Parents Involved could not
reasonably have based its holding on international human rights
law. Both the ICCPR and CERD prohibit racial discrimination.348
However, Article 1(4) of CERD states: “Special measures taken
for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain
racial or ethnic groups or individuals . . . shall not be deemed
racial discrimination.”349 Moreover, international human rights
law generally recognizes the difference between racial
classifications intended to harm disfavored minorities (which
violate human rights principles), and racial classifications
intended to benefit disfavored minorities (which do not violate
human rights principles).350 Hence, Parents Involved is a case
where international human rights law does not provide a

344. Id. at 710.
345. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 318, at 704–09.
346. In the Seattle case, the contested plan was adopted by the school
district’s Board of Directors, which is an elected body. Brief for Respondents at
2–7, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007) (No. 05-908), 2006 WL 2922956. In the Louisville case, the contested plan
was adopted by the Jefferson County Board of Education, a body consisting of
seven members elected for four-year terms. Brief for Respondents at 1–4,
Meredith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 547 U.S. 1178 (2006) (No. 05-915),
2006 WL 2944684.
347. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 803 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s
interference with local decision-making was unwarranted).
348. See ICCPR, supra note 311, art. 26; CERD, supra note 319, art. 2.
349. CERD, supra note 319, art. 1, para. 4.
350. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative
Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253
(1999).
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substitute for U.S. constitutional law, as currently interpreted by
the Supreme Court.
Parents Involved illustrates two key points about the
polymorphous model. First, under a polymorphous model, the
Court would invariably apply constitutional law to decide some
cases because international law does not always support the
Court’s preferred outcome. Second, contrary to the fears raised by
international law skeptics,351 judicial application of international
human rights law is not incompatible with local, decentralized
decision-making. To the contrary, affirmative action is an area
where international human rights law would permit a large
measure of local autonomy, but the Supreme Court—by
exercising its constitutional lawmaking power—has mandated a
uniform federal rule limiting the policy options available to state
and local governments.
C. Objections to the Polymorphous Model
This subpart addresses four key objections to the project of
reviving a polymorphous model of public law litigation. The
objections relate to federalism, individual rights, national
identity, and institutional competence.
1. Federalism
Some scholars assert that judicial application of
international human rights treaties would undermine federalism.
Because human rights treaties address matters traditionally
regulated by the States, application of those treaties by federal
courts would shift power from the States to the federal
government. Hence, the polymorphous model is flawed insofar as
it envisions judicial application of international human rights
treaties.352
351. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the
States Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 530–31
(2004) (discussing the alleged conflict between federalism principles and
international human rights law).
352. Id.
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This objection is without merit. It is difficult to identify a
single right protected under human rights treaties ratified by the
United States that is not already regulated at the national
level.353 Under the incorporation doctrine, most rights protected
by human rights treaties have already been applied to the states
via incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.354 Other
rights have been nationalized by virtue of federal civil rights
legislation.355 Accordingly, when the United States ratified the
ICCPR, the federal Executive Branch told the Senate that federal
constitutional and statutory law protected virtually all the rights
protected by the treaty.356 The Executive Branch provided similar
assurances regarding the CERD and the Torture Convention.357
Thus, the federalism objection is unfounded because the United
States nationalized human rights law in the latter half of the
twentieth century.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has nationalized some rights
through aggressive constitutional interpretation that would be
left primarily to local decision makers under international human
rights standards. Examples include the Second Amendment right
to bear arms,358 the First Amendment right to spend money on
political campaigns,359 and the Fourteenth Amendment right to
be free from affirmative action programs.360 If implementation of
a polymorphous model encouraged the Court to view individual
rights issues through an international human rights lens, the
353. The federalism objection may have greater force with respect to
unratified treaties, especially CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. Here, I address the objection only insofar
as it applies to the ICCPR, CERD, and the Torture Convention, the three
principal human rights treaties ratified by the United States.
354. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (specifying a long
list of rights protected by the Bill of Rights that have been applied to the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment).
355. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964)
(upholding Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and rejecting argument that the
statute exceeded the scope of national power).
356. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 10 (1992).
357. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 103-29, at 25–26 (1994); S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30, at
13–28 (1990).
358. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 323–25 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 348–50 and accompanying text.
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Court might reevaluate its jurisprudence in these areas and
conclude that nationalization of some or all of these rights is
unwarranted. Thus, adoption of a polymorphous model could
potentially promote the goals of federalism by fostering greater
local autonomy on some issues.
2. Individual Rights
Others may object that the polymorphous model would
weaken protection for individual rights. The model encourages
courts to decide cases by applying rules that Congress can
modify. If courts apply the model, there will invariably be cases in
which courts issue decisions protecting individual rights and
Congress overrides those decisions, thereby weakening protection
for individual rights.361
Granted, the possibility of congressional override is an
integral feature of the polymorphous model. To understand the
model fully, though, one must consider potential judicial
responses to override legislation. In Hamdan, as discussed above,
Congress overrode the Court’s decision by enacting the Military
Commissions Acts (MCA).362 Currently, criminal defendants in
military commission proceedings retain the right to challenge the
MCA on federal constitutional grounds. Thus, the Supreme Court
still holds a trump card: in a properly presented case, the Court
could decide that certain features of the MCA violate defendants’
constitutional rights.363 Therefore, by applying a polymorphous
model and deciding Hamdan on grounds that left open future
legislative options, the Court did not relinquish its power to
invalidate legislation that violates constitutional rights. The
361. See, e.g., Scott Act, supra note 247 (prohibiting Chinese laborers from
reentering the United States after leaving). The statute was motivated, at least
in part, by a desire to reverse the effect of the Supreme Court decision in Chew
Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884). See supra notes 247–50 and
accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 326–36 and accompanying text (discussing Hamdan
and the Military Commission Acts).
363. For example, the Military Commissions Act of 2009 permits admission
into evidence of some statements obtained by coercive methods. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 948r(c) (2012). The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of
this provision.
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same will be true, generally, in any case where the Court leaves
an opening for future legislative deliberation.
This observation raises a further objection. Because the
Court’s power to invalidate federal legislation gives it the
ultimate trump card, the ostensible “popular sovereignty”
benefits of the polymorphous model are illusory. In the end, the
Court is presented with a zero-sum choice between individual
rights and popular sovereignty. If the Court invalidates the MCA,
individual rights trump popular sovereignty. However, if the
Court upholds the legislation, popular sovereignty trumps
individual rights. Realistically, there is no third option.
Therefore, the polymorphous model cannot deliver on its promise
to reconcile the tension between individual rights and popular
sovereignty.
This objection fails to appreciate the benefits of the
polymorphous model. By deciding a case on the basis of treaty
law, the Court gives both Congress and itself opportunities for
further deliberation. Recall the Court’s decision in Miller v.
Alabama, holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits States
from imposing a mandatory life-without-parole (LWOP) sentence
on juvenile offenders.364 Under the polymorphous model, the
Court could have reached the same result by applying Article 24
of the ICCPR.365 In that case, Congress could have held hearings,
invited expert testimony, and debated whether to adopt federal
legislation authorizing States to impose mandatory LWOP
sentences, notwithstanding the Court’s interpretation of Article
24.366 If Congress decided not to enact such legislation, the
outcome would be identical to the result in Miller, but the process
generating that outcome would be more consistent with principles
of popular sovereignty. If Congress chose to enact legislation
overriding the Court’s (treaty-based) decision, the Court would
retain the power to invalidate that legislation. However, in
contrast to the actual case, the Court would have the benefit of
recent congressional deliberations to inform its judgment. Thus,
the polymorphous model promotes democratic deliberation about
the appropriate level of protection for human rights and enriches
364.
365.
366.

132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
See supra notes 339–40 and accompanying text.
See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
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judicial decision-making by providing courts with additional
input from legislative hearings and debates.
3. National Identity
Another potential objection to the polymorphous model goes
something like this. Our national identity as Americans is
inextricably linked to our shared commitment to the
Constitution. Judicial review based on constitutional law is a
vital expression of our national identity. If U.S. courts routinely
applied human rights law as a substitute for constitutional law,
we would be forsaking a core element of our national identity.367
One response to this objection involves history. The analysis
in Parts III and IV above demonstrates that federal courts
actually applied a polymorphous model for much of our nation’s
history. Before the Civil War, federal courts applied international
law much more frequently than they applied constitutional law to
resolve public law controversies.368 Clearly, they did not believe
that judicial application of international law was “un-American.”
To the contrary, the founding generation believed that our
nation’s commitment to international law was a core element of
our national identity.369
Granted, in today’s world a shift from judicial reliance on
constitutional law to greater reliance on international law would
involve a change in our self-perception as Americans. However,
that change could have very positive repercussions. Many people
in other parts of the world view Americans as hypocrites. From
their standpoint, we use international human rights rhetoric to
criticize other countries for their failings, but we refuse to subject
ourselves to the same standards.370 A greater judicial willingness
367. Professor Rubenfeld has advanced a similar argument. See Jed
Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971 (2004).
368. Supra Figure Three.
369. See generally David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized
Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of
International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010).
370. See, e.g., Russia: Human Rights Report Criticizes U.S. and Others, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, at A8 (reporting that Russia’s Foreign Ministry “singled
out the United States” and attacked as hypocritical the U.S. human rights
record).
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to apply international human rights standards to evaluate the
conduct of domestic government actors could enhance the U.S.
image in the world and help counter the hypocrisy charge.
4. Institutional Competence
The final objection relates to institutional competence.
Polling data show that the American public has a very low
opinion of Congress. According to recent Gallup polls, “[t]hirteen
percent of Americans approve of the job Congress is doing . . .
Congressional approval has rarely been 20% or higher in the last
three years.”371 In contrast, the American public has a more
favorable opinion of the Supreme Court: “Forty-six percent of
Americans approve of the way the Supreme Court is handling its
job.”372
Suppose the public’s opinion is well founded. Suppose, in
other words, that judicial lawmaking by the Supreme Court
actually promotes the general welfare more effectively than
legislative lawmaking by Congress, at least with respect to
certain subject areas. The polymorphous model is designed to
transfer power from the Supreme Court to Congress. If the Court
is really a more competent legislator than Congress in some
areas, then transferring power over those issues from the Court
to Congress would yield a net loss to public welfare.
Ultimately, the question of comparative institutional
competence is an empirical question. Given our nation’s
deep-rooted commitment to popular sovereignty, those who claim
that the Supreme Court has a comparative advantage, and who
advocate enhanced judicial power on that basis, must produce
very compelling evidence of the Court’s superior lawmaking
ability to justify vesting greater legislative power in the Supreme
Court. At present, with respect to constitutionally protected
371. Jeffrey M. Jones, Congress Job Approval Starts 2014 at 13%, GALLUP
(Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/166838/congress-job-approval-starts2014.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
372. Andrew Dugan, Americans Still Divided on Approval of U.S. Supreme
Court, GALLUP (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165248/americans-stilldivided-approval-supreme-court.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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individual rights, the claim that the Supreme Court is a better
legislator than Congress remains unproven. Moreover, even if
advocates of broad judicial power could prove their case
empirically, the appropriate response might be to devise practical
methods to improve Congress’s performance, rather than
abandoning faith in representative democracy.
VI. Conclusion
This Article introduces a conceptual distinction between
polymorphous public law litigation and constitutionalized public
law litigation. The Article demonstrates that federal courts
applied a polymorphous model of public law litigation in the
nineteenth century. Constitutionalization, by contrast, is a more
recent development.
The preceding analysis challenges conventional wisdom in
four ways. First, conventional wisdom holds that public law
litigation is a twentieth century invention.373 The Article
documents the rich tradition of public law litigation in federal
courts in the nineteenth century. Second, conventional wisdom
holds that application of international law to protect individual
rights from government infringement is a modern departure from
traditional international law.374 The Article demonstrates that
federal courts in the nineteenth century regularly applied
international law to protect individual rights from government
infringement.
Third, conventional wisdom holds that protection of
individual rights from government infringement requires judicial
application of constitutional law.375 The Article shows that federal
courts in the nineteenth century provided robust protection for
individual rights without applying constitutional law. Moreover,
the Article suggests that federal courts in the twenty-first
century could protect individual rights from government

373. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 31, at 4–7 (describing the development of
public law litigation in the twentieth century).
374. E.g., Milena Sterio, The Evolution of International Law, 31 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 213, 253–55 (2008).
375. E.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 28, at 1013.
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infringement by applying international human rights law as a
partial substitute for federal constitutional law.
Fourth, conventional wisdom holds that judicial application
of international law is anti-democratic.376 In contrast, the Article
contends that the combination of constitutionalization and
judicial supremacy has exacerbated the tension between judicial
review and popular sovereignty. U.S. lawyers and judges could
mitigate that tension by relying more on international law, and
less on constitutional law, to resolve public law controversies. In
sum, a twenty-first century revival of the nineteenth century
tradition of polymorphous public law litigation––which includes
greater judicial reliance on international law––would help move
the current, constitutionalized system of public law litigation in a
direction that would be more consistent with the democratic
commitment to popular sovereignty.

376.

E.g., McGinnis & Somin, supra note 47, at 1193–94.
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Phase One
Database

65-70%
(2790-2968)

68-73%
(1583-1689)

60-70%
(1418-1649)

49-54%
(2763-3070)

40-44%
(1960-2178)

36-38%
(1657-1726)

25-29%
(397-467)

32-37%
(386-449)

PG
(Public Law)

21-22%
(894-924)

21%
(487-494)

24-25%
(580-589)

38-40%
(2158-2281)

52-54%
(2576-2663)

60-63%
(2740-2852)

69-72%
(1109-1144)

61-64%
(742-778)

PP
(Private
Law)

9-13%
(397-545)

6-11%
(153-259)

5-14%
(116-338)

8-12%
(442-657)

3-6%
(164-316)

1-3%
(71-115)

1-4%
(21-56)

2-5%
(28-55)

Other

Table One: Summary of Data from Phase One Database Data Supporting Figure One

POLYMORPHOUS PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
1845

1846

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1757 (2014)

Notes to Table One
1. In the PG column, the higher numbers (and higher
percentages) are based directly on the phase one database.
The lower numbers (and lower percentages) are estimates
that account for errors identified in phase two. The phase
two analysis identified several cases in each time period
that were incorrectly classified as PG in phase one.
2. In the PP and “Other” columns, the lower numbers (and
lower percentages) are based directly on the phase one
database. The higher numbers (and higher percentages)
are estimates based on errors identified in phase two. For
each time period, the estimates account for the number of
PP cases in the phase two database that were incorrectly
classified as PG in phase one, and the number of “other”
cases in the phase two database that were incorrectly
classified as PG in phase one.
3. The phase two analysis did not address periods 4 and 5, so
the estimates for periods 4 and 5 are based on average
error rates for other time periods. The average error rates
used for periods 4 and 5 are as follows:
a. Ten percent of cases classified as PG in phase one
are not PG.
b. Four percent of cases classified as PG in phase one
should have been classified as PP.
c. Seven percent of cases classified as PG in phase
one should have been classified as Other.

8.4%
[4.0, 12.8]
(N=155)
44.1%
[35.4, 52.8]
(N=127)
6.3%
[2.1, 10.5]
(N=127)
42.5%
[34.1, 50.9]
(N=134)
9.0%
[4.1, 13.9]
(N=134)
52.2%
[43.7, 60.7]
(N=134)

(2) Private Party
Raised Con Law Claim

(4) Court Below
Applied Con Law to
Decide Merits

(5) Supreme Ct.
Applied Int’l Law to
Decide Merits

(6) Supreme Ct.
Applied Con Law to
Decide Merits

(7) Supreme Ct.
Applied Neither Int’l
Law nor Con Law

(3) Court Below
Applied Int’l Law to
Decide Merits

41.9%
[34.1, 49.7]
(N=155)

(1) Private Party
Raised Int’l Law Claim

Period
One
(1801-1835)

45.5%
[37.0, 54.0]
(N=134)

16.4%
[10.1, 22.7]
(N=134)

41.8%
[33.4, 50.2]
(N=134)

15.4%
[9.5, 21.3]
(N=143)

18.4%
[12.4,24.4]
(N=163)
46.9%
[38.7, 55.1]
(N=143)

41.7%
[34.1, 49.3]
(N=163)

Period
Two
(1836-1864)

64.1%
[56.5, 71.7]
(N=156)

21.2%
[14.8, 27.6]
(N=156)

15.4%
[9.7, 21.1]
(N=156)

16.4%
[10.6, 22.2]
(N=159)

18.4%
[12.7, 24.1]
(N=179)
15.7%
[10.0, 21.4]
(N=159)

15.6%
[10.3, 20.9]
(N=179)

Period
Three
(1865-1888)

50.7%
[42.6, 58.8]
(N=148)

47.3%
[39.2, 55.4]
(N=148)

4.1%
[0.9, 7.3]
(N=148)

49.0%
[41.2, 56.8]
(N=157)

50.9(%)
[43.3, 58.5]
(N=169)
3.2%
[0.4, 6.0]
(N=157)

4.7%
[1.5, 7.9]
(N=169)

Period
Six
(1936-1954)

41.2%
[34.1, 48.3]
(N=187)

58.3%
[51.2, 65.4]
(N=187)

1.1%
[0, 2.6]
(N=187)

61.7%
[54.9, 68.5]
(N=196)

(N=196)

63.3%
[56.8, 69.8]
(N=215)
1.0%
[0, 2.4]

.9%
[0, 2.2]
(N=215)

Period
Seven
(1954-1972)

Table Two: Data Supporting Figures Three, Four, Five

30.3%
[24.7, 35.9]
(N=264)

68.2%
[62.6, 73.8]
(N=264)

3.8%
[1.5, 6.1]
(N=264)

68.4%
[63.0, 73.8]
(N=291)

73.7%
[69.0, 78.4]
(N=331)
2.7%
[0.8, 4.6]
(N=291)

3.0%
[1.2, 4.8]
(N=331)

Period
Eight
(1972-2005)
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Notes to Table Two
1. For all cells, N is the number of cases in the sample on
which the estimate is based. Numbers in brackets show
the 95% confidence interval for the estimate.
2. For rows 1 and 2, N is the total number of cases in the
phase two database for each period, after eliminating: (1)
cases that were not “public law” cases; and (2) cases for
which there was insufficient information.
a. For rows 3 and 4, N is the subset of those cases for
each period that yielded a decision on the merits in
the court below. The “court below” is the last court
that addressed the case before it reached the
Supreme Court.
b. For rows 5–7, N is the subset of those cases for
each period that yielded a decision on the merits in
the Supreme Court.

43.4%
[35.2, 51.6]
(N=143)
4.9%
[1.4, 8.4]
(N=143)
44.4%
[35.6, 53.2]
(N=124)
5.6%
[1.5, 9.7]
(N=124)
53.2%
[44.4, 62.0]
(N=124)

(1) Private Party
Raised Int’l Law
Claim
(2) Private Party
Raised Con Law
Claim

(3) Supreme Ct.
Applied Int’l Law to
Decide Merits
(4) Supreme Ct.
Applied Con Law to
Decide Merits
(5) Supreme Ct.
Applied Neither Int’l
Law Nor Con Law

Period
One
(1801-1835)

56.5%
[46.3, 66.7]
(N=92)
4.3%
[0.1, 8.5]
(N=92)
41.3%
[31.2, 51.4]
(N=92)

58.0%
[48.8, 67.2]
(N=112)
6.2%
[1.7, 10.7]
(N=112)

Period
Two
(1836-1864)

21.8%
[13.7, 29.9]
(N=101)
8.9%
[3.3, 14.5]
(N=101)
69.3%
[60.3, 78.3]
(N=101)

21.7%
[14.1, 29.3]
(N=115)
6.1%
[1.7, 10.5]
(N=115)

Period
Three
(1865-1888)

5.9%
[1.3, 10.5]
(N=102)
28.4%
[19.6, 37.2]
(N=102)
68.6%
[59.6, 77.6]
(N=102)

4.2%
[0.6, 7.8]
(N=120)
34.2(%)
[25.7, 42.7]
(N=120)

Period
Six
(1936-1954)

2.0%
[0, 4.7]
(N=104)
30.8%
[21.9, 39.7]
(N=104)
68.3%
[59.3, 77.3]
(N=104)

1.7%
[0, 4.1]
(N=117)
36.8%
[28.0, 45.6]
(N=117)

Period
Seven
(1954-1972)

2.6%
[0, 5.5]
(N=117)
49.6%
[40.5, 58.7]
(N=117)
49.6%
[40.5, 58.7]
(N=117)

2.1%
[0, 4.4]
(N=145)
59.3%
[51.3, 67.3]
(N=145)

Period
Eight
(1972-2005)

Table Three: Data Supporting Figure Six Claims Against Federal Government Actors
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Notes to Table Three
1. All cases in Table Three are cases in which the private
party alleged unlawful conduct by a federal government
actor.
2. For all cells, N is the number of cases in the sample on
which the estimate is based. Numbers in brackets show
the 95% confidence interval for the estimate.
3. For rows 1 and 2, N is the total number of Fed cases in the
phase two database for each period, after eliminating
cases that were not “public law” cases, and cases for which
there was insufficient information.
4. For rows 3–5, N is the sub-set of Fed cases for each period
that yielded a decision on the merits in the Supreme
Court.

5.9%
[0, 12.4 ]
(N=51)
45.1%
[31.3, 58.9]
(N=51)
9.5%
[0.5, 18.5]
(N=42)
42.9%
[27.8, 58.0]
(N=42)
54.8%
[39.6, 70.0]
(N=42)

(2) Private Party Raised Con
Law Claim

(3) Supreme Ct. Applied Int’l
Law to Decide Merits

(4) Supreme Ct. Applied Con
Law to Decide Merits

(5) Supreme Ct. Applied
Neither Int’l Law Nor Con
Law

Period Two
(1836-1864)

(1) Private Party Raised Int’l
Law Claim

Period One
(1801-1835)

54.5%
[41.2, 67.8]
(N=55)

43.6%
[30.4, 56.8]
(N=55)

3.6%
[0, 8.6]
(N=55)

40.6%
[28.5, 52.7]
(N=64)

4.7%
[0, 9.9]
(N=64)

Period Three
(1865-1888)

10.9%
[1.8, 20.0]
(N=46)

89.1%
[80.0, 98.2]
(N=46)

0
[0, 4.3]
(N=46)

91.8%
[84.1, 99.5]
(N=49)

6.1%
[0, 12.9]
(N=49)

Period Six
(1936-1954)

7.2%
[1.6, 12.8]
(N=83)

92.8%
[87.2, 98.4]
(N=83)

0
[0, 2.4]
(N=83)

94.9%
[90.5, 99.3]
(N=98)

0
[0, 2.0]
(N=98)

Period Seven
(1954-1972)

15.0%
[9.2, 20.8]
(N=147)

83.0%
[76.9, 89.1]
(N=147)

4.8%
[1.3, 8.3]
(N=147)

84.9%
[79.7, 90.1]
(N=186)

3.5%
[0.8, 6.2]
(N=186)

Period Eight
(1972-2005)

Table Four: Data Supporting Figure Seven Claims Against State and Local Government Actors
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Notes to Table Four
1. All cases in Table Four are cases in which the private
party alleged unlawful conduct by a state or local
government actor.
2. For all cells, N is the number of cases in the sample on
which the estimate is based. Numbers in brackets show
the 95% confidence interval for the estimate.
3. For rows 1 and 2, N is the total number of state/local cases
in the phase two database for each period, after
eliminating cases that were not “public law” cases, and
cases for which there was insufficient information.
4. For rows 3–5, N is the sub-set of state/local cases for each
period that yielded a decision on the merits in the
Supreme Court.

(4) Challenge
Legislation
(Fed Cases)
(5) Counter
Majoritarian Claims
(Fed Cases)
(6) Majoritarian
Claims
(Fed Cases)
(7) Challenge
Legislation
(SL Cases)
(8) Counter
Majoritarian Claims
(SL Cases)
(9) Majoritarian
Claims
(SL Cases)

(1) Challenge
Legislation
(All Cases)
(2) Counter
Majoritarian Claims
(All Cases)
(3) Majoritarian
Claims (All Cases)
7.7%
[3.5,11.9]
(N=155)
5.8%
[2.1, 9.5]
(N=155)
89.7%
[84.9, 94.5]
(N=155)
2.8%
[0.1, 5.5]
(N=143)
2.8%
[0.1, 5.5]
(N=143)
95.1%
[91.6, 98.6]
(N=143)

15.3%
[9.8, 20.8]
(N=163)
12.9%
[7.7, 18.1]
(N=163)
79.1%
[72.8, 85.4]
(N=163)
1.8%
[0, 4.3]
(N=112)
0.9%
[0, 2.7]
(N=112)
92.9%
[88.1, 97.7]
(N=112)
45.1%
[31.3, 58.9]
(N=51)
39.2%
[25.7, 52.7]
(N=51)
49.0%
[35.1, 62.9]
(N=51)

17.3%
[11.7, 22.9]
(N=179)
15.1%
[9.8, 20.4]
(N=179)
79.3%
[73.4, 85.2]
(N=179)
4.3%
[0.6, 8.0]
(N=115)
4.3%
[0.6, 8.0]
(N=115)
93.9%
[89.5, 98.3]
(N=115)
40.6%
[28.5, 52.7]
(N=64)
34.4%
[22.7, 46.1]
(N=64)
53.1%
[40.8, 65.4]
(N=64)

35.5%
[28.3, 42.7]
(N=169)
34.3%
[27.1, 41.5]
(N=169)
47.9%
[40.3, 55.5]
(N=169)
20.0%
[12.8, 27.2]
(N=120)
19.2%
[12.1, 26.3]
(N=120)
65.0%
[56.4, 73.6]
(N=120)
73.5%
[61.0, 86.0]
(N=49)
71.4%
[58.6, 84.2]
(N=49)
6.1%
[0, 12.9]
(N=49)

28.4%
[22.4, 34.4]
(N=215)
28.4%
[22.4, 34.4]
(N=215)
36.7%
[30.2, 43.2]
(N=215)
14.5%
[8.1, 20.9]
(N=117)
14.5%
[8.1, 20.9]
(N=117)
63.2%
[54.4, 72.0]
(N=117)
44.9%
[35.0, 54.8]
(N=98)
44.9%
[35.0, 54.8]
(N=98)
5.1%
[0.7, 9.5]
(N=98)

34.4%
[29.3, 39.5]
(N=331)
31.7%
[26.7, 36.7]
(N=331)
23.6%
[19.0, 28.2]
(N=331)
21.4%
[14.7, 28.1]
(N=145)
21.4%
[14.7, 28.1]
(N=145)
40.7%
[32.7, 48.7]
(N=145)
44.6%
[37.4, 51.8]
(N=186)
39.8%
[32.7, 46.9]
(N=186)
10.2%
[5.8, 14.6]
(N=186)

Period One Period Two Period Three Period Six Period Seven Period Eight
(1801-1835) (1836-1864) (1865-1888) (1936-1954) (1954-1972) (1972-2005)

Table Five: Data Supporting Figures Eight and Nine
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Notes to Table Five
1. “Fed Cases” are cases in which the private party alleged
unlawful conduct by a federal government actor. “SL
Cases” are cases in which the private party alleged
unlawful conduct by a state or local government actor.
2. See Part IV.E for definitions of “majoritarian claims” and
“countermajoritarian claims.”
3. For rows 1, 4, and 7, a case counts as “challenge
legislation” if a private party challenged the validity of
legislation adopted by a federal, state, or local legislature.
4. For all cells, N is the number of cases in the sample on
which the estimate is based. Numbers in brackets show
the 95% confidence interval for the estimate.
5. For rows 1–3, N is the total number of cases in the phase
two database for each period, after eliminating: (1) cases
that were not “public law” cases; and (2) cases for which
there was insufficient information.
a. For rows 4–6, N is the subset of those cases that
count as “Fed Cases.”
b. For rows 7–9, N is the subset of those cases that
count as “SL Cases.”
6. All data in Table Five is based on private party claims, not
judicial decisions.

